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Abstract 
More than half a million people were killed in a series of massacres in Indonesia from 
October, 1965 to March, 1966. These events were followed by 32 years of authoritarian rule 
with state propaganda and strict media control hindering public debate. This analysis looks at 
the coverage of these massacres in the Indonesian press today, to reveal to what degree it is 
influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. The analysis shows that the coverage 
is hampered by formal and informal restrictions which primarily encourage Indonesian press 
workers to self-restrain from investigative reporting into so-called sensitive issues, such as the 
1965/66 massacres. The ownership structures in the media sector are particularly influencing 
independent reporting, as the powerful political elite are significant shareholders of major 
media conglomerates. Practices and traditions from the New Order era still remain in today’s 
news rooms and are also contributing factors to self-censorship, and a lack of professionalism 
and ethical standards serve to sustain these practices. The Indonesian press are today 
critiquing the authorities without significant fears of repercussions by state institutions, but 
has still not yet fully embraced their role as a ‘watchdog’. A mission to contribute to 
developing the nation seems to be deemed equally important, in line with the traditions of 
development journalism and the Pancasila philosophy.  
Sammendrag 
Flere enn en halv million mennesker ble drept i en serie massakre i Indonesia mellom oktober 
1965 og mars 1966. Deretter fulgte 32 år med et autoritært regime med statlig propaganda og 
streng mediekontroll som hindret offentlig debatt. Denne analysen ser på dekningen av disse 
massakrene i dagens indonesiske presse for å avdekke i hvilken grad den er påvirket av 
eksterne restriksjoner og selvsensur. Analysen viser at formelle og uformelle restriksjoner 
begrenser dekningen da disse i all hovedsak oppfordrer til selvsensur og fører til mindre 
undersøkende journalistikk på områder som 1965/66 massakrene. Eierskapsstrukturene innen 
mediesektoren står særlig i veien for uavhengig journalistikk i Indonesia, ettersom den 
politiske eliten er eiere av store mediekonglomerater. Tradisjoner og journalistisk praksis fra 
tiden under militærstyret er fortsatt i stor grad gjeldene og bidrar også til selvsensur, og 
manglende profesjonalitet og etiske normer gjør at denne praksisen opprettholdes. Indonesisk 
presse kritiserer myndighetene uten i særlig grad å frykte følger fra statlige institusjoner, men 
har fortsatt til gode å fungere fullt ut som ‘vaktbikkje’, og er i tillegg opptatt å bidra til sosial 
utvikling i tråd med tradisjoner som utviklingsjournalistikk og Pancasila-filosofien.  
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Preface 
‘Sometimes we need our gangsters to get things done’. This was said by the former vice 
president of the Republic of Indonesia
i
 and the chairman of the country’s branch of one of the 
world’s largest humanitarian organizations. The occasion was a celebration of a para-military 
youth organization claimed to be part of mass-killings in the 1960s, which are considered to 
be one of the world’s worst massacres in the 20th centuryii. The speech became part of a 
documentary which I watched in the Saga movie theatre in Oslo, whilst thinking of the 
several times I had met with the man on the screen on various humanitarian issues whilst 
working in the country in 2012. Affected by the disturbing content of the documentary, where 
self-proclaimed executioners re-enact their murders from the sixties, I wondered if these 
words said by a leader of a humanitarian organization and a candidate considered for the 2014 
presidential elections, had led to any discussions in the Indonesian public. I searched online, 
but could not find any immediate evidence that it had. The documentary suggests that the 
perpetrators from 1965/66 are considered by many as national heroes for their actions, which 
allegedly saved the nation from falling into the hands of communists. I started to wonder if 
these were the views of the Indonesians I know. And I reflected upon the fact that I had heard 
remarkably little mention of the massacres, considering the magnitude of the events. How 
well are these brutalities of the past known by the Indonesians themselves? Following these 
events the country entered into a dictatorship with strict media control, which ended in 1998. 
Have these events from the sixties been a topic of public discussion after the democratization? 
Or has there been – and perhaps still is – reluctance to voice opinions publicly about these 
issues? In search of answers I got in touch with an Indonesian friend who replied by saying 
that he had a family story to share, which he had just learned of himself.  I was compelled to 
learn more, about his personal story and about the journalistic space for public discussions on 
the 1965/66 massacres in today’s Indonesia. The topic for my master thesis was then decided.  
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Introduction 
More than half a million people were killed in a series of massacres from October, 1965 to 
March, 1966 in Indonesia. Exactly how many died is still uncertain as there were few records 
of the events as they took place and the numbers vary between half a million and two million 
people (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009:296.). The victims were mainly members of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), which until then had been the 
largest communist party in the non-communist world and appeared well-placed to come to 
power after the departure of the president at the time. The massacres followed an attempted 
coup d‘etat, which PKI was accused of orchestrating, and paved the way for the accession to 
power of Major General Suharto and his New Order regime. Suharto’s authoritarian rule 
lasted until 1998, during which the propagated official line was that the purge of communists 
was necessary to avoid communist influence (Roosa, 2006:5-7).  
To date, there have been no judicial prosecutions, official apologies, compensation offered to 
the victims or other forms of reconciliation. Even after the democratization of the country, 
there seems to have been little public debate on the issue. In 2012, two events happened that 
can be said to have influenced the in-country conversation about the massacres. Firstly, a 
report after the first official inquiry into the events concluded that the events met all the 
criteria of a gross violation of human rights
iii
, and several recommendations were provided for 
government follow-up. Secondly, the documentary The Act of Killing by Canadian-American 
Joshua Oppenheimer was released, which is a British-Norwegian-Danish co-production with 
financial contributions from, amongst others, the Freedom of Expression Foundation Oslo. 
The documentary gives the viewer insight from the perspectives of the perpetrators, who re-
enact the killings they committed in the 1960s. The entire Indonesian production crew chose 
to remain anonymous due to fear of reprisals after the movie's release. The film was offered 
for free via the internet
iv
, and several public screenings led to protests and violence, and some 
screenings were thus banned from taking place.  
These events indicate that the 1965/66 massacres still stand as unresolved and appear to be a 
relevant issue even today, nearly fifty years after the events took place. Sixteen years has 
passed since the end of the authoritarian military regime and the strict censorship and media 
control (Hill, 2007:11). Why has there been little public debate on the issue after 
democratization? What are the conditions for openly discussing the massacres after almost 
half a century of silence?  What is the content of the public debate in today’s Indonesian press?  
ix 
 
The research question for the master thesis is: 
How do Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 massacres today, and to what degree is the 
coverage influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship? 
To help me answer the research question I developed the following assisting questions: 
1. What are the issues raised in articles relating to the 1965/66 massacres in the 
newspapers Kompas, The Jakarta Post and The Jakarta Globe, and what are the 
perceptions identified in the articles of communists, the Indonesian government, 
politicians, the military and radical religious groups? 
 
2. To what degree do Indonesian journalists experience formal or informal restrictions in 
covering the 1965/66 massacres? 
Thesis structure 
I will start this thesis by presenting the backdrop for the 1965/66 massacres and the political 
situation leading up to the establishment of the New Order regime. I will look at the situation 
during the New Order period, focusing particularly on the state propaganda and the conditions 
for the press. Thereafter I will look at the political situation post-New Order with emphasis on 
freedom of speech and its limitations in the legal framework and the conditions for the press 
in today’s Indonesia, particularly with regards to ownership structures.  
In chapter 2, I will reflect on the relevant theory of free speech, the relationship between the 
government and the press, as well as propaganda, including censorship and particularly focus 
on self-censorship.  
Chapter 3 will present information on how I selected the data material and the methods used 
for the analysis, and I will also use this chapter to critically reflect on possible limitations in 
the material that may affect the outcome of the analysis.  
On the basis of the above mentioned elements in the first three chapters, chapter 4 will 
interpret the collected data material and seek to find answers to my research questions, and in 
chapter 5 I will draw my conclusions. Lastly, I will present a bibliography of the literature and 
documents used and referred to in this thesis.
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1. Background 
In the following I will give an overview of some of the main political developments in 
Indonesia from 1965 to the present day, focusing on their influence on the media. This to 
provide a better understanding of the circumstances in which the 1965/66 massacres took 
place as well as a history of the press in Indonesia. Thereafter I will present a brief status of 
freedom of speech and the legal restrictions in Indonesia in more recent years as a backdrop 
for the following analysis 
1.1 Entering the New Order regime 
There are various versions about what actually happened and who were behind the events 
leading up to the massacres and the following 32 years of authoritarian military rule in 
Indonesia. On October 1
st
, 1965, six army generals and a lieutenant were kidnapped and killed 
in Jakarta. Those responsible called themselves the September 30
th
 Movement and stated that 
their aim was to protect the president from right-wing army generals who were plotting a coup 
d’état. Hundreds of soldiers belonging to the Movement occupied the central square of the 
capital city in a show of strength. General Suharto took command of the Indonesian Army and 
launched an immediate counterattack and sent all the rebel troops fleeing within few days 
(Roosa, 2006:5).  
The situation was used by Suharto as a pretext for delegitimizing the sitting president and 
seizing power. He blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) of initiating and 
organizing the Movement, and claimed that it was an attempted start of ‘a massive, ruthless 
offensive by the PKI against all non-communist forces and an opening salvo for a social 
revolt’ (Roosa, 2006:5-7). To prevent this from happening, Suharto instigated a severe and 
brutal anti-communist repression, and more than half a million people were killed between 
October, 1965 and March, 1966.  
PKI’s role in the September 30th Movement is today highly controversial, and many historians 
find it unconvincing. They especially question the motivation for the PKI to go to such an 
extreme at a time when they appeared to be well-placed to take over power legitimately 
(Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009:296). To fully know what happened is however difficult 
as ‘nearly all the personal testimonies and written records from late 1965 onward seem 
intended to misdirect, obfuscate, or deceive’ (Roosa, 2006:7). 
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1.2 The New Order regime 1966 - 1998 
In an atmosphere of national emergency Suharto established himself as the de facto president 
in March, 1966 and the original legal legislation authorized him to ‘restore order’. That was 
an emergency order, but Suharto decided that the exception of 1965 was permanent, and the 
military operation remained in force until the end of his regime. He sustained the  ‘latent 
threat of communism’, which was the very foundation of and justification for his regime 
(Roosa, 2006: 13). He presented himself as the saviour of the nation for defeating the 
communists. His regime incessantly drilled the event into the minds of the populace by every 
possible method of state propaganda: textbooks, monuments, street names, films, museums, 
commemorative rituals and national holidays. Under Suharto anti-communism became the 
state religion, complete with sacred sites, rituals and dates. The site of the murder of the seven 
army officers became holy ground where a monument of seven life-size bronze statues of the 
deceased officers stands. This has become a common field-visit by school children. Every 
30th September, all TV-stations were required to broadcast a film commissioned by the 
government named The Treason of the September 30th Movement / PKI (1984). This four-
hour film about the kidnapping and killing of the seven army officers in Jakarta became 
mandatory annual viewing for all schoolchildren. 
1.2.1 The press in New Order Indonesia 
Within a week of Suharto's seizing power, the press was under complete military control. The 
press was immediately used to spread anti-PKI propaganda.  One story described how PKI 
members had tortured, mutilated, and castrated the captured generals. These stories have been 
shown to be false, but the propaganda spread through newspapers and radio stations are 
claimed to have added fuel to the fire and contribute to an escalating situation and mob 
mentality amongst the population during the massacres (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009: 
292, Roosa 2006: 63). 
Within a short period of time after the new regime was established, approximately one-third 
of the country’s newspapers were shut down. For the survivors, Suharto put into place ‘an 
intricate, if chaotic, web of security restrictions and draconian legislation’ to control what was 
published in the press (Hill, 2007:11).  
The decade prior to the New Order were characterized by ‘a vibrant, often caustically partisan 
press, organized along party lines, technologically and financially impoverished but richly 
committed to stimulating public debate and mobilising public opinion, even if this brought it 
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into direct conflict with government policies’ (Hill, 2007; 14). In the fifties Suharto’s 
predecessor made the press responsible for mobilizing public opinion and dubbed the press 
the ‘tool of the revolution’ (ibid).  
The New Order government was more moderate in its call to the media industry and claimed 
that the role of journalism was ‘to safeguard national security against internal and external 
threats’ and to be the ‘guardian of the Pancasila’ (Hill, 2007: 15). The Pancasila is the five 
ideological principles of the nation, which were initially introduced by then president Sukarno 
but re-interpreted and given the following meaning by the New Order government:  ‘Belief in 
1) the one and only God 2) a just and civilized humanity 3) the unity of Indonesia 4) 
democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives 5) social justice for 
all Indonesian people’ (Hill, 2007: 15 footnote 5). In this way, Suharto’s government sought 
to ensure that the press were answerable ultimately to the government.  
From 1966 to 1995 there was massive growth in the Indonesian economy, which was referred 
to by the World Bank as ‘The East Asian Economic Miracle’ (Baker et al, 1999: 4). This had 
a great effect on the press. The Indonesian middle class grew and had more purchasing power 
and the newspapers became more popular with advertisers. In addition, the press’ new 
political independence led to broader circulation amongst the readers. In the 1980s and 90s 
the Indonesian press industry transformed dramatically, and there was substantial media 
expansion. While pursuing commercial success, the Indonesian press was declared by New 
Order to be ‘free but responsible’ in contrast to the implied irresponsibility of liberal, western 
newspapers. The media that survived the bans of the 1970s generally reached an 
accommodation with the government. Most media organizations proved to be sufficiently 
‘self-regulating’ and there were thus few banning orders in the 1980s and 1990s (Hill, 2007: 
51).  
1.3 Post New Order Indonesia  
Three decades of authoritarian rule under President Suharto ended in 1998 with a weak 
economy, hyper-inflation, political instability and an uncertain future for Indonesia. Many 
believed that poor information available in the media led to the significant consequences of 
the financial crisis of 1997. Censorship inflicted by the government, but also the generally 
poor quality of journalism, were said to be reasons for the lack of preparedness for the 
potential risks. Problems were claimed to be hidden from the public view and thus inhibited 
intelligent risk analysis. People did therefore not have an accurate understating of how 
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radically conditions had changed. The consequences were that the ideals of the Pancasila 
press were ignored with focus moving to the importance of improving both press freedom and 
the press' function as a ‘watchdog’ (Romano 2003:48).  
 
The Governments’ poor handling of the financial crisis led to protests and student 
demonstrations and, in the final stage, to the demand for president Suharto's departure (Baker 
et al, 1999: 5). In May of 1998, Suharto stepped down and left the presidency to B.J. Habibie. 
The end of the dictatorship was accompanied by an immediate increase in freedom to publish 
facts and opinions. While some journalists published serious analyses and investigations of 
socio-political issues, others published sensationalist mixes of fact, speculation and rumour 
(Romano 2003: 65). The press thus saw a need to increase professionalism and ethical 
standards and the Kode Etikk Wartawan Indonesian (Indonesian Journalists’ Code of Ethics) 
was created. This is an umbrella code, which all associations accept in addition to their 
individual codes. One aim of the unified code was to reduce the potential of future 
governments to claim that state regulation or corporatized statuses are necessary to 
standardise industry ethics and practices (Romano2003: 66-67). 
 
Suharto’s removal paved the way for Indonesia to transform into a democratic nation. 
Amongst the numerous reforms undertaken (Reformasi) was a decentralization process and 
the empowerment of power of regional councils through devolution. Sixteen years after the 
end of Suharto’s dictatorship and five presidencies later, Indonesia is today recognized as a 
democracy with a strong economy, and the country is amongst the leading nations in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  In the 2014 presidential elections, 
Indonesians chose Jakarta governor Joko Widodo from the Great Indonesian Movement Party 
(PDI-P), a candidate considered more independent of the political and military establishment 
than his opponents, and his presidency is claimed by many to represent a new and positive 
direction for Indonesia
v
.  
1.3.1 Freedom of speech and legal regulations  
Freedom of speech in Indonesia is guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution, which was 
reaffirmed in 2002. Chapter 10, Article 28F states
vi
: 
 
Every person shall have the right to communicate and to 
obtain information for the purpose of the development of 
his/her self and social environment, and shall have the right 
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to seek, obtain, possess, store, process and convey 
information by employing all available types of channels 
 
Reporters Without Borders ranked Indonesia as number 139 out of 178 countries on their last 
Press Freedom Index
vii
. In the current situation foreign journalists are not authorized to travel 
to the restive provinces of Papua and West Papua without special permission. In addition, 
reporters sometimes face violence and intimidation, which in many cases goes unpunished. 
The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AIJ) recorded 56 cases of violence against 
journalists in 2012, in addition to 12 separate incidents against journalists in Papua alone
viii
.  
 
There are also a number of legal and regulatory restrictions. Legislation that restricts the 
freedom of expression includes the Defamation Laws. These fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Penal Code where defamation is defined as ‘written or oral communication that is against the 
will of the affected party and that they may find offensive’ix. The frequent use of these laws is 
claimed by some to encourage self-censorship in the coverage of sensitive subjects. 
Additional concerns have arisen with recent legislation such as the Informational Technology 
Crime Bill and the Anti-Pornography Law, both introduced in 2008. These are accused of 
giving broad and sweeping power to the authorities to censor the web
x
 and containing vague 
wording and can be misused
xi
.   
 
In 2013, the Law on Mass Organizations was passed which allows the government greater 
control over public activities, including the power to disband an organization deemed a threat 
to the state. The NGOs are specifically forbidden from espousing ‘anti-Pancasila’ creeds 
including atheism, communism, and Marxist-Leninism. Critics of the law claim that it 
infringes upon the rights to freedom of association, religion and expression (in the article 
Freedom under grave threat in The Jakarta Post, July 3
rd
, 2013)  
The legal framework for authorized censorship said to be vague and broad and thus open to 
undue misinterpretations
xii
. Until 2010 Indonesia kept in active use a law on book-banning 
which was first introduced under the Law on Printed Materials Pacification. This was a 
widely used tool to censor publications that could disrupt public order, particularly concerning 
the 20
th
 century political turmoil. In 2006, a total of thirteen high school history books were 
banned from publication because they failed to mention the role of the Indonesian Communist 
Party in the kidnapping and assassination of army generals in the September 1965 Movement. 
Books may still be banned by lower courts or under the Anti-Pornography and Anti-
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Blasphemy Laws.  Films can by censored by the Film Censorship Institute which is a 
Government-supervised institution, and between 2006 and 2009 four documentary films were 
banned because all were about Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor.  
1.3.2 Media ownership  
Reforms that followed the fall of the Suharto regime resulted in a more healthy media 
environment in Indonesia. However, the liberalization of the information market did not 
significantly alter media ownership. New investors in the media industry have included 
members of a web of political, well-connected business people that surrounded former 
President Suharto`s family and friends, or heads of conglomerates who have strong ties with 
powerful officials. The ruling elite have built up large portfolios of shareholdings in media 
companies. According to a study published jointly by the Ford Foundation and the 
Participatory Media Lab at Arizona State University in 2011
xiii
, twelve media groups owned a 
hundred percent of the national commercial television shares and five out of six newspapers 
with the highest circulation, as well as all four of the most popular online news media, a 
majority of flagship entertainment radio networks, and a significant portion of the major local 
television networks. Most of these are involved also in non-media related businesses and have 
strong commercial interests and power. Amongst them are veteran players with relative 
political autonomy, but also those with obvious political ties. Media Group is, for instance, 
owned by the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the former ruling party Golkar; Bakrie & 
Brothers is owned by the Chairman of the Golkar party; Trans Corpora (Trans TV and Trans 
7) is owned by a close ally of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the owner of 
the MNC Group is known for his close relations with major political players. This will be 
further elaborated on and discussed under the analysis in chapter 4.  
1.4 Concluding remarks 
In the above I have presented background information to set the scene and establish a context 
relevant for the analysis under chapter 1. I found it necessary to present the political situation 
in the 1960s as the pretext for the massacres and highlight some of the political developments 
until today and what it has meant for the press. Worth mentioning is that Indonesia was in a 
state of emergency at the time when the massacres took place in 1965/66. General Suharto 
seized power after an attempted coup d’état allegedly orchestrated by the communist party, 
and the state of emergency was extended until the end of his reign in 1998. One third of news 
media were shut down in the sixties, and the remaining were used to spread propaganda and 
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placed under strict government control. As the country’s financial situation changed in the 80s 
and 90s, so did the media industry; its formal freedom was expanded. However, the media 
was self-regulatory and still closely tied with the political establishment through ownership 
structures. These ownership structures remain, but the game still changed as the authoritarian 
rule ended, and democracy was established. The media used its new freedom, and the 
question is what the status is today on how freely the media can report on topics sensitive to 
the authorities.  
2. Theory 
The analysis for this thesis aim to reveal how the Indonesian press covers the 1965/66 
massacres today and if the coverage is influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. 
The question is rather broad and thus I will in the following present also a broad spectre of 
theory that I find relevant for the analysis.  
Indonesia has since the end of the New Order transformed into a democracy and whether it is 
still in an emerging or transitional phase is debated and some will claim that the country is not 
yet comparable to western democracies in ensuring human rights to its citizens and with it 
freedom of speech. I will for this thesis understand Indonesia as a transitional democracy. I 
will in the following discuss the press in transitional democracies and whether there are 
differences in the role of the press in transitional and well-established democracies. In this 
chapter, I will present theory with basis in the western media tradition which might be argued 
to be more applicable to established democracies than to the Indonesian context, which I will 
reflect on successively. I presume however that the below theory is of relevance as basis for 
the analysis under chapter 4 and can provide a broader insight relating to the research question 
for this thesis.   
Looking at the development and transformation from the dictatorship to the current 
democracy in Indonesia, I find it relevant to present propaganda theory. In the background 
chapter, I described how the press was used to propagate a certain version about the 
circumstances under which the massacres took place. The complexity of the events and 
various sides to the story were moulded into a simple narrative about evil versus good, which 
placed the ruling government in a good light. Details that did not fit well into this narrative 
were left out and conflicting versions were silenced. As I will argue for below, censorship is 
for this thesis included as a propaganda technique. Censorship will be emphasized in the 
following, as my analysis aim to reveal if and how the press workers in Indonesia experience 
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restrictions on their freedom to report, either directly or indirectly by being encouraged to 
self-censor. Self-censorship and its causes will be a central part of this theoretical presentation. 
As an underlying theme for this thesis, freedom of speech theory will also be touched upon in 
the following, particularly relating to its limitations.  
2.1 The press in transitional democracies 
The most universally endorsed ideal characteristics of the media are freedom and 
independence (Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:6). When developing their for-mentioned 
annual, world-wide Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders measure these 
characteristics. As do Freedom House for their annual survey which looks at the degree to 
which each country permits the free flow of news and information considering the legal, 
political, and economic environments. The normative functions of the media are often based 
on the characteristics of representative or liberal democracies. These include as mentioned 
above for the press to serve as a channel for public expression and a forum for public debate, 
as a space for developing ideas and the mind of the individual and encouraging participation 
in political processes, as well as to function as a ‘watch dog’ and a guardian against the abuse 
of power
xiv
.  Thus, transforming the media into fully democratic institutions is a challenging 
task for several reasons. One of them is that the relationship between the media is highly 
ambivalent. Also, the media institutions will still retain elements of the logic and constraints 
of their predecessors and the journalists will still hold values that are rooted in their 
professional life under the old regime (Voltmer and Rownsley, 2009 in Jebril, Stetka and 
Loweless, 2013:6).) The guarantee of freedom of speech is usually undisputed constitutionally 
in transitional democracies and has been implemented in virtually all (ibid). In emerging 
democracies the function of the press is most often assumed to be the same as in established 
democracies, where the main function is said to be to hold the government and political elites 
accountable (Voltmer, 2006a, Scammel and Semtko, 2000a, Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990 in 
(Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:6-7). The role of the press as the ‘forth estate’ or 
‘watchdog’ means that they serve as a means for voters to make decisions by disseminating 
information about government actions. This understanding of the press’s role is strongly 
rooted in the liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism. Emerging democracies are 
however also claimed to develop unique types of media systems that differ significantly from 
the above, and according to McConnell and Becker, 2002) ‘journalistic professionalism is 
argued to be embedded in the wider cultural traditions of a given country and to reflect the 
needs and expectations of audiences’ (Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:7). This creates 
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several – and larger – gaps between the ‘ideal’ and the reality of journalism than in 
established democracies.  
 
Indonesia is a consensus-oriented culture, in which the president is traditionally seen as the 
ultimate father-figure of the national family. Under the New Order era, the Indonesian press 
was as mentioned in chapter 1 supposed to be ‘free and responsible’. According to Steele 
(2005: 94) press freedom under the New Order was understood to mean freedom to ‘assist the 
state in carrying out programs for social and economic development’. This is significantly 
different than the western concept of press freedom which emphasizes freedom from 
government control. Being ‘responsible’ meant avoiding “anything that was likely to inflame 
ethnic, religious, racial, or group (class) tensions’ (ibid). The Indonesian Press Council’s 1974 
guidelines said on this basis that the responsibility of the press was to ‘hold high the national 
consensus’ and to cooperate with community and government in a manner ‘inspired by the 
family’ (Romano 2003:44).  This is in line with the Pancasila philosophy as described in 
chapter 1. Kompas reporter Ratih Hardjono wrote in 1998 that the controlling word for 
journalists remain ‘ responsibility’, which means to protect what government ministers or 
officials think is best for the nation or their careers
xv
. In a survey of 65 Indonesian journalists 
in 2003, Angela Romano found that the majority of the journalists saw no contradiction 
between the role of a Pancasila journalist and the role as a ‘watchdog’ (Romano, 2003: 57). 
What the interviewed journalists did however object to was the aggressiveness in the way that 
the ‘watchdog’ role was conducted in western journalism (ibid). The findings of a nation-wide 
survey among 600 Indonesian journalists conducted by Pintak and Setiyono (2010) support 
this. According to their analysis, Indonesian journalists have not yet fully embraced the role 
as a ‘watchdog’, even if most reject the ‘government-mouthpiece media functions’ under the 
New Order period.  ‘The echo of the development journalism model that prevailed in the 
Suharto years can be seen in the top priorities of Indonesian journalists’ (Pintak and Setiyono, 
2010: 1).  
 
I will in the following, as mentioned, present research and theory with basis in western media 
tradition which may be argued to be more applicable for the situations in established 
democracies different to the Indonesian context. Their relevance will therefore be discussed 
successively with the traditions of the ‘responsible’ Pancasila journalist in mind.  
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2.2 Freedom of speech – the term and its justifications 
According to the philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, there is a distinction between two concepts of 
freedom; negative and positive. Negative freedom means that one has freedom from 
constraints. Positive freedom is, on the other hand, ‘the freedom to actually achieve what you 
want to do’ (Warburton 2009:7). There are two kinds of ethical systems used to justify 
freedom of speech. According to a utilitarian approach, freedom of expression is required as a 
means or ‘instruments’ towards other ends. Preserving free speech ‘produces tangible benefits 
of some kind’ (Warburton 2009: 16). Free speech is for example said to promote the public 
debate necessary for democracy to function efficiently. Citizens need to be exposed to a range 
of ideas to be able to make good judgments. Free speech allows citizens to be informed about 
a variety of views by people who strongly believe in them. The focus here is, in other words, 
on consequences, and these arguments are thus dependent upon empirical verification of 
argued consequences. If the supposedly beneficial consequences of free speech for the 
individual or society turn out not to follow, then justification for free speech evaporates (ibid).  
 
A non-consequentialist or deontological view, on the other hand, does not depend upon 
confirmation of predicted consequences of preserving freedom of expression. According to 
this approach arguments are based on a notion of a built-in value of free speech and its 
connection with a concept of human dignity (Warburton 2009: 16). Preventing people from 
speaking their views, or listening to others’ views, would be failing to respect them as 
individuals capable of thinking and deciding for themselves, and thus simply wrong 
(Warburton 2009: 17) 
Dahl (1999) states that the demand for freedom of speech lies in this double reasoning: 
Freedom of speech as an individual right and freedom of speech as a means to create a well-
functioning society (Dahl, 1999: 10). 
2.2.1 Freedom of speech and the press 
Freedom of speech entails not only a right to speak, but a right to speak in public. This means 
there must be channels through which one can publicly voice one’s opinion. Press freedom is 
thus sometimes used as a synonym to freedom of speech. The press does have a double 
function. It is to be a channel for information and opinions, but the press also has a positive 
obligation to ensure that the freedom of speech is used. Freedom of speech is protected only 
through being used (Dahl, 1999: 11). This obligation, which is in the form of an unwritten 
11 
 
contract between the media and society, also entails that the information presented through 
the press is relevant, balanced and well-funded. Diversity of opinion must be reflected upon 
and the depth of expression ensured (ibid).  
2.2.2 Limitations to freedom of speech 
Defenders of freedom of expression almost without exception recognize the need for some 
limits to the freedom they advocate. In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute 
in any country and the right is commonly subject to limitations. There are often legal 
regulations when it comes to libel, defamation and national security matters, as well as hateful 
or racist expressions or blasphemy. The latter three are often more of a grey zone in legal 
frameworks in the western world and thus more related to ethics than law. In some Muslim 
countries, such as Indonesia, in particular blasphemy is often well-regulated by law. Under 
the analysis in chapter 4 formal restrictions in the Indonesian legal framework, such as 
blasphemy laws, will be discussed. However, the main part of my analysis will focus more on 
looking into whether there are informal limitations through external influences and internal 
considerations for the press to self-censor on the issue of the 1965/66 events. 
2.3 A propaganda model 
In Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky (1988) introduce a propaganda model 
which draws on Marxist ideology to explain the complex dynamics of politics, media and the 
corporate world. In this model they state that there is an institutional bias in the commercial 
news media that guarantees the mobilization of certain propaganda campaigns on behalf of 
elite consensus, thus this system is far more credible and effective in putting over a patriotic 
agenda than one based on official censorship. The propaganda model describes five 
editorially-distorting filters applied to news reporting in mass media: 1) the size, concentrated 
ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) 
advertising as the primary income-source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on 
information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved by these 
primary sources and agents of power; (4) the use of official and elite-based "flak" as a means 
of disciplining the media; and (5) "anti-communism" as a national religion and control 
mechanism (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:29). These elements interact with and reinforce one 
another. The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the 
cleansed residue fit to print. (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 2) 
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The Propaganda Model is a model developed for western media and above all related to the 
American context. Thus, there is a question to how well it does fit with the Indonesian reality. 
The ‘anti-communism’ filter can however be argued to be very relevant for the context in 
Indonesia, despite that it was developed with the Cold War situation in mind.  During the 
Cold War, the ideology of anti-communism was a form of control mechanism which provided 
journalists with a pre-defined understanding of global events and political elites with a 
rhetorical tool to criticize anyone who questioned government decisions as unpatriotic. 
Revolutions in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba as well as well-publicized abuses of 
communist states had led to a strong opposition to communism in Western ideology and 
politics when Manufacturing Consent was published in 1988.  According to Herman and 
Chomsky there is a lack of demand for evidence to support the claims of abuses by 
communists ‘when anti-communist fever is aroused’ and  ‘defectors, informers and assorted 
other opportunists move to centre stage as experts where they remain even after being 
exposed as highly unreliable, if not downright liars’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:30). 
It has been questioned whether the anti-communism filter in the Propaganda Model have lost 
its relevance in western media in the post-Cold War period. Dimaggio (2009:14) claims 
however that the anti-socialist and anti-communist continue to be a mainstay of media 
commentary, but adds that the filter can be interpreted to also include anti-terrorism as 
another means of silencing criticism. For the Indonesian context, Dimaggio’s first point is 
seems to be descriptive of the situation. As presented in chapter 1 the propagated narrative in 
New Order was that the communists orchestrated the alleged coup d’etat and the massive re-
percussions that followed saved the nation from a communist takeover that would have 
destroyed the nation. Suharto’s rule was based around communism as ‘evil’ and massive state 
propaganda ensured a shared understanding of communism as the common enemy (Hill, 
2007:16). To what extent this is still the conception of the ideology and if this filter is in fact a 
contributing means to limiting the debate around the 1965/66 massacres, will be part of the 
analysis in chapter 4.  
Another filter that I will argue is relevant for the Indonesian context is ‘the size, ownership 
and profit orientation of mass media’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988:3). Their common interests 
with government as well as other major business actors may present a challenge to the press 
role as a ‘forth estate’. Direct interventions or more indirect influence on editorial decisions 
by media owners may be contributing reasons for why some stories are never told. Selecting 
and rewarding journalists may for instance be done according to what extent they are 
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considered challenging to elite interests and career prospects may be reasons for journalists 
and editors to self-censor (Robinson in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 98). Concentration of 
ownership was encouraged by both the state and market forces as early as 1975 (Dhakidae, 
1991: 283) and ownership of the media groups was concentrated’ in the hands of a powerful 
few from the ruling elite who controlled the flow of news’ (Tapsell in Asian Review Studies 
June 2012: 232). Major media organizations diversified their business interests to other 
industries (Hill, 2007:81-110), a legacy that, according to Tapsell, has continued also after the 
end of the New Order era (Asian Review Studies June 2012: 232). These aspects will be 
discussed in the analysis in chapter 4.  
Herman and Chomsky’s five filters represent the means by which propagandistic messages 
are conveyed by media and not the crux of what constitutes propaganda. Below I will look at 
the meaning of the term propaganda and present theory on censorship as one of the 
propaganda techniques.  
2.4 Propaganda – The term 
There are numerous definitions of propaganda. A definition much referred to is by Jowett and 
O’Donnell (1999): ‘Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired 
intent of the propagandist’ (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012: 7). 
This definition emphasizes that propaganda is seeking to achieve to either ‘rouse an audience 
to certain ends and usually resulting in significant change, or to render an audience passive, 
accepting and non-challenging’ (Szanto in Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012: 17).  
Propaganda can be separated into white, grey, or black propaganda. White propaganda comes 
from a known or identified source, and the information in the message tends to be accurate. 
Black propaganda includes lies, fabrications, and deceptions and occurs when the source is 
concealed or credited to a false authority. Grey propaganda is somewhere in-between the two. 
Whether the information is accurate is uncertain and the source may or may not be correctly 
identified (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012: 17-20). Propaganda is sometimes referred to as 
disinformation. This is usually considered black propaganda and means ‘false, incomplete, or 
misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group or 
country’ (Shultz and Godson in Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012:24).  
14 
 
Propaganda does not necessarily need to be a negative and is, according to Jowett and 
O’Donnell (1999: 2-4), a neutral term and a description of a process for convincing someone 
of something. Propaganda can merely be considered within its context depending on who the 
source is, who the target is and what the aim is.  Prior to the First World War propaganda was 
used to describe the means the promoters of a doctrine used to spread its message to their 
audiences. The term was however discredited in the 1930s as a result of the procedures of the 
Nazis. Today the term propaganda is viewed as negative and should be avoided in society as it 
can cause significant damage. However, in times of conflict and crisis it is considered more 
legitimate, particularly if the interests of one’s nation are threatened. If the aim is, for instance, 
to liberate the nation from occupation, the threshold for accepting propaganda is higher.  
Kempf (2002:166-169) claims that war propaganda is a separate kind of propaganda, which 
presents conflict in such a way as it supports military logic rather than the perspectives of a 
peaceful solution. In his opinion Military conflicts have low legitimacy and thus need to be 
portrayed as necessary. The intentions and justifications are idolized, and the actions seen as 
legitimate and rightful and the opponents’ actions are denounced. Kempf’s definition of war 
propaganda differs from Jowett and O’Donnell’s as it is presented as an instrument of war 
rather than a something that can be neutral.   
2.5 Propaganda, influence and information 
A central dilemma in propaganda theory is to distinguish propaganda from other forms of 
communication. Propaganda may appear to be informative communication when ideas are 
shared, something is explained, or instruction takes place. Information communicated by the 
propagandist may appear to be indisputable and totally factual. The propagandist knows, 
however, that the purpose ‘is not to promote mutual understanding but rather to promote his 
or her own objectives’. Thus, the propagandist will attempt to control information flow and 
manage a certain public’s opinion by shaping perceptions through strategies of informative 
communication (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012: 45). The true purpose and the identity of the 
propagandist are likely to be concealed. There are many forms of information control , such as 
withholding information, releasing information at predetermined times, releasing information 
in juxtaposition to other information that may influence public perception, manufacturing 
information, communicating information to selected audiences and distorting information. 
There are two major ways for the propagandists to control information flow. One of these is to 
control the media as a source of information distribution. Another is to present distorted 
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information from what appears to be a credible source. The latter can be done by using 
journalists to infiltrate the media and spread disinformation (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012. 46). 
2.6 Propaganda techniques 
There are many variations of categorizing propaganda techniques. Jowett and O’Donnell do 
not list an exhaustive overview but present some of the central techniques.  Amongst these is 
the use of metaphors and images. The use of certain words and images can directly influence 
how some events are perceived by a population. Rhetoric may be used to explain certain 
events to create sympathy for the propagandist’s position, and thus achieve or maintain 
support amongst the population. Metaphors or terms have also been used to downplay or 
disguise events. Ways of speaking from one discourse are used in another. Harming people 
has for instance been referred to by using the term ‘mop up’, which usually refers to cleaning. 
The medical term ‘operation’ serves as another example, which is often used to describe 
military actions. By using these metaphors the actions come across as less brutal (Eide 
2003:2). Metaphors have been used to compare opponents to people with negative 
connotations, such as Hitler or Stalin. Quoting Philip Knightly (1975), Ottosen (1995) 
describes how an important element in war reporting is to demonize the enemy (Ottosen 
1995:99). To invent or maintain an enemy image creates, according to Ottosen, expectations 
of inhuman, aggressive or hostile actions by those included in the enemy image. He defines an 
enemy image as a negative stereotypical description of a nation, state, religion, ideology, 
regime or state leader (Ottosen, 1994: 103). 
2.6.1 Censorship  
As mentioned above, the propagandist will attempt to control the information flow. One of the 
many ways to do so is withholding information. I will in what follows look at the issue of 
censorship. Censorship differs from the other propaganda techniques. Some claim that even if 
censorship often appears together with propaganda, censorship and propaganda are two 
different entities (Fosland 1993: 16-17). Others, such as Jowett and O’Donnell (2012), are of 
the opinion that censorship is a technique propagandists utilize. For this thesis I have chosen 
to organize my analysis around the latter understanding.  
A definition of censorship sometimes referred to is ‘the changing or the suppression or 
prohibition of speech or writing that is deemed subversive to the common good. It occurs in 
all manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modern times it has been of special 
importance in its relation to governments and the rule of law’ (Encyclopædia Britannica 
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Online 2014). What ‘common good’ means to the authorities will vary. Censorship is 
however a means to seek to hinder utterances that will be understood as not in line with what 
is considered best for society at large.  
When looking at the classical literature about freedom of speech, such as John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty (1859), one may get the impression that the question of freedom of speech or 
censorship is a question of either/or. In practise, however, there are no necessarily clear lines 
between the two (Dahl, 1999: 26). Censorship has a long history and has appeared in different 
ways in different cultures. From the very beginning of writing, the established power players 
have found ways to impose bans and restrictions on writers. Throughout the 18
th
 century it 
became continuously more difficult for the world’s regimes to explain or institutionalise 
censorship. This resulted in a more ‘hidden censorship’ over the last century. According to 
Michael Scammel, it is almost a global phenomenon that every time censorship is introduced 
the censors censor the word censorship (Dahl, 1999: 27-28). This can for instance be done 
through using euphemisms when naming the censorship authorities, such as, for example, 
South-Africa’s previous Publications Appeal Board or Indonesia’s Law on Printed Materials 
Pacification which was used to ban books. According to Dahl (1999:28), the term censorship 
in peace time is discredited in all languages.  
In times of war or crisis, however, the situation may be another.  In liberal, Anglo-American 
tradition of journalism, extensive literature says there is a consistency between the agendas of 
governments and media. Robinson (in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 97) refers to Glascow 
University Media Group (1985); Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 1988: Bennett 1990; 
Bennett and Paletz 1994; Mermin 19999; Wolfsfeld 1997. This research suggest collectively 
that ‘media rarely report outside the bounds of what Daniel Hallin (1986) described as elite-
legitimated controversy’ (Robinson in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 97). Hallin found in that the 
media was less oppositional to the US policy during the Vietnam War than previously 
believed, and the media rarely, if ever, argued that the war was fundamentally wrong or 
immoral (ibid). Dahl (1999:28) claims the muse of freedom of the press and information is 
silenced when a war threatens or breaks out. He points to history and the legitimacy of 
censorship as a principal during both the First and Second World Wars. Journalists and editors 
were then active in the role not only as propagandists for their governments, but also as 
censors making sure that nothing unfortunate was revealed about their nations.  
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During more recent and current wars, such as the Gulf War and the Wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, many journalists seem to accept a lesser and more one-sided access to 
information. This has led to several media critical discussions around the issue of control and 
restrictions, however uncritical and biased reporting from war zones is still not uncommon in 
practise (Ottosen in Eide, 2004: 218). Norstedt and Ottosen (2000) have found that the 
nation’s security policies and foreign political orientations still influence the national media 
discourse (Ottosen in Eide, 2004: 198).  
The above describes the role of the press in traditional conflicts between nations according to 
the liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism. Thus, the relevance to the situation in 
Indonesia is not obvious and debatable.  As presented in chapter 1, Indonesia was in a 
national crisis in 1965 with alleged coup d’état and a military emergency order. The 
emergency state was kept until the end of the New Order and the press was expected to be 
loyal to the government throughout Suharto’s rule. This expectation for the press to be loyal 
towards the sitting government in its fight against a threat to the current state is highly 
relevant for the Indonesian context. It may be argued that the expected loyalty to the state by 
the ‘responsible’ Pancasila journalist may in parts resemble the approach of the media in 
times of conflict or crisis according to western media tradition. The loyalty expected by the 
‘responsible press’ in Indonesia did however go beyond national security and in addition to 
restrictions to writing unfavourably about national unity, the military, and dissent in outer 
regions of the archipelago, the list also included the President’s life or family business interest, 
the business activities of senior officials, or corruption or mismanagement stories with 
‘sensitive’ political overtones (Romano, 2003:164-165). In this way, the mass media became 
‘the most important area of maintenance and reproduction of the New Order’s legitimation’ 
(Hill, 1994:60).  
If there is still an expectation for the Indonesian press to be ‘responsible’ and avoid ‘taboo 
topics’ such as President Suharto’s family, and racial or religious conflicts (SARAxvi) , will be 
discussed in the analysis in chapter 4. I will also present additional theory relating this under 
the following section about self-censorship.  
2.7 Self-censorship  
There is a distinction between when boundaries are drawn by an outside power about what to 
write or publish and when journalists and editors are not openly directed but choose 
themselves not to report or to ignore aspects of a story. The latter is referred to as self-
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censorship. In other words it is an act of knowingly excluding information or distorting or 
under-reporting information that could be of public interest. There is no widely accepted 
definition. According to McLaughlin (Ottosen, 2001: 223 – 224), self-censorship means that 
journalists or editors have information they choose not to publish. This may appear also when 
institutional control-mechanisms by the authorities are in place. Dahl (1999: 20) considers 
self-censorship to be a mechanism where the editor determines out of his or her own 
considerations what is to be published and what is not to be published. If all editors make the 
same decision about a specific case, then there is a situation where the self-censorship is part 
of the press corps as a whole and comes from internalized norms which concerns each actor 
as much as the communion.  
Self-censorship is a universal challenge for critical journalism. In a special edition of The 
Colombia Journalism Review (May/Jun 2000) self-censorship is referred to as a ‘living reality’ 
and a survey showed that 25 per cent of the American journalists questioned for the survey 
revealed that they had not printed articles in order to avoid potential conflicts with their own 
editors or readers (Ottosen 2001: 224). In interviews following the survey, many shared that 
they avoided developing ideas that will lead to uncomfortable situations for themselves.  
To choose what information to include and what to exclude is a central part of the journalistic 
profession. This decision-making process can potentially be influenced by various external 
factors and these may not always be obvious.  Some of these are referred to in the paragraph 
above. The American journalists in the survey wanted to avoid conflicts with editors or 
readers or uncomfortable situations.  Tapsell (in Asian Studies Review June 2012:229) claims 
self-censorship occurs ‘when journalists limit or ignore aspects of a story because they fear 
repercussions for those with vested interests who are cited in their report’. A study by 
Mužíková, Chaaban, Salomon, & Lee (2013) explains that self-censorship is practised ‘in order to 
avoid trouble or sanctions from state officials, striking controversy, offending an audience, initiating 
lawsuits or other problematic consequences’. The latter definition suggests that the reasons for 
self-censorship can be many. Causes for self-censorship may also differ in various country 
contexts. A sensitive issue in one country may be openly discussed in another. In the analysis 
for this thesis I will look into the Indonesian context and self-censorship specifically relating 
the topic of the 1965/66 massacres. In this connection the tradition of the Pancasila journalist 
may be relevant to highlight. Journalists in Indonesia (and elsewhere in Asia) have been told 
by their officials that self-censorship is a ‘responsible’ function to ‘build and develop the 
nation’ (Romano, 2005: 4). The idea of responsibility evolved in the 1980s and 1990s as 
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developmental journalism, which was widely implemented in many Third World countries 
particularly in Asia. Steele (2011:96), claim some still advocate this and that there are 
members of the press in Indonesia that believe that ‘responsible journalists should filter or 
tone down reports about sensitive issues, arguing, for example, that it is better simply not to 
report inter-religious or ethnic violence’ (in Tapsell, Asian Studies Review June 2012:228). 
Whether this is supported by the findings in this thesis and if it applies to the issue of the 
1965/66 massacres, will be discussed under the analysis in chapter 4.  
Another potential cause for self-censorship relating the Indonesian context is the media 
ownership structures described under chapter 1. In their survey Pintak and Setiyono (2010:16) 
found that one-third of the 600 interviewed Indonesian journalists identified the ownership 
structures of the media as a threat to journalism. Tapsell concluded in his study that self-
censorship is still evident in the Indonesian media and that it usually occurs when journalists 
believe ‘they must adhere to the owner’s agenda on certain stories, rather than report freely 
and comprehensively on all topics’ (in the Asian Studies Review June 2012: 241) According 
to Tapsell the control over the news flow has shifted from the government and military to ‘an 
oligarchic group of media owners political and business interests’ (in the Asian Studies 
Review June 2012:228). As described in chapter 1 of this thesis, business interests are often 
interlinked with political interests in Indonesia as many of the media owners are also high-
level politicians or affiliated with the established political elite. Robinson and Hadiz (2004) 
questioned whether there in fact has been ‘a deeper social and political transition’ after the 
democratization and market reforms in Indonesia. This is supported by Tapsell (in the Asian 
Studies Review June 2012:228), who claims that the powerful ruling elite in Indonesia 
encourage self-censorship to limit criticism of its actions (ibid).    
In previous years Indonesian journalists self-censored out of fears of repercussions by state 
institutions, and the question remains if members of the Indonesian press still self-restrain due 
to founded or unfounded fears of state interventions. Another means to encourage self-
censorship can be broad and unclear formal restrictions on freedom of speech backed by 
government authority, which will also be discussed in the analysis in chapter 4.  
In their propaganda model presented above, Herman and Chomsky (1988) refer to various 
news filters. One could argue that similar filters are at play in connection to self-censorship 
that effect at the level of the individual journalist.  Filters such as reliance on information 
particularly from government sources, the orientation towards profit by journalists, flak, and 
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anti-communism as a national religion could all to some extent serve as explanations for self-
censorship. This will be looked further into in the analysis. 
As described in the section about censorship, other factors come into play in times of conflict 
and crisis. There are examples that the threshold for when journalists are uncomfortable to 
cover certain stories is particularly low in all situations that concern state security (Ottosen in 
Eide, 2004: 223).  In the Nordic press journalists have in various periods of time avoided 
giving the audience insight into sensitive issues that concern the interests of the nation. 
Finnish journalists restrained themselves when dealing with the former Soviet Union and the 
Norwegian press was loyal to the workers’ movement and avoided covering certain issues 
concerning state security. Self-censorship and conscious or unconscious self-restraints are 
according to Ottosen a well-documented and recognized problem in how the media deal with 
sensitive issues that concerns the interests of the nation (Eide, 2004: 223). 
The above causes for self-censorship are by no means an exhaustive list and, as mentioned 
above, these causes may also differ in various country contexts. In the following analysis I 
will look into whether Indonesian journalists do self-censor with regards to the 1965/66 
massacres and try to uncover the reasons why.   
3. Selection and method 
The research question for this thesis is: How do Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 
massacres today and to what degree is the coverage influenced by external restrictions and 
self-censorship? To find the answer present some methodological challenges. Finding out 
about legal restrictions is easy enough. However, revealing the more informal restrictions and 
what influences the journalists to self-censor are more ambitious tasks. I will look into articles 
relating to the 1965 massacres to find out how this topic is covered in Indonesian press today.  
That will, however, merely provide me with parts of the answer to my research question. I 
also see to answer if the coverage is influenced by informal restrictions and self-censorship. I 
will thus need to find out why the topic is being covered the way it is, as well as to reveal 
what is not being printed and why. I therefore choose to conduct qualitative interviews in 
addition to analysing articles on the topic of the 1965/66 massacres. Some of the interview 
subjects are also the writers of some of the reference articles. However, my list of 
interviewees also include journalists who cover topics such as politics, human rights and 
defence issues, as well as a former journalist and current journalism professor and human 
rights activists and one of the co-producers of the documentary The Act of Killing.    
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In this chapter, I will present the reference articles and interviewees and the process of 
selecting them. The methods that will be used for the analysis will be presented and I will also 
look at how to evaluate qualitative research. In addition, I will critically reflect upon my 
selection process and choices and the limitations of the methods I use and the selected 
material. Finally I will consider the ethical aspects in the research process.  
3.1 Material selection 
In the following I will present my selected material and describe how it was collected and the 
considerations behind the decisions to choose the respective material.  
3.1.1 Reference articles 
To find out how the Indonesian press covers the massacres in 1965 today, I looked into 
articles related to this topic in three newspapers. These are the Jakarta Post, the Jakarta 
Globe and Kompas. The first two are English-language papers and the third is in Indonesian. I 
chose to include the latter, even though I do not speak the language, to see if there are any 
differences in the coverage between the English-language papers and the Indonesian-language 
Kompas. It also reaches out to a larger number of the population and has a more diverse group 
of readers, as well as having a longer history with its being one of the oldest newspapers in 
Indonesia. All three newspapers have online editions. I however chose to look at the coverage 
in the paper versions. Thus was I able also to calculate how much space each paper devoted to 
the story, where it was placed and look at other editorial priorities, which I think adds value to 
a comprehensive analysis. A more detailed presentation of the three papers follows in 3.2.2. 
As I was interested to identify the press coverage of the 1965 massacres today, I chose to look 
at the time frame of September, 2013 to March, 2014. My assumption was that the 
nomination for an Academy Award for the documentary The Act of Killing and a possible 
award would lead to an increased number of articles about the 1965 massacres in the 
Indonesian newspapers. The nomination was announced January 16
th
, 2014 and the Academy 
Award winner was announced March 2
nd
. Since this time period is somewhat short, I decided 
to include some additional months to ensure that I would have a sufficient number of articles 
to analyse. I chose to include the months following September 30
th
, 2013 which was the 48
th
 
anniversary of the start of the massacres.  
The articles were collected from the newspapers’ archives. The Jakarta Post had a library 
with physical copies of the newspapers, where I went through the issues from the selected 
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time period searching for relevant articles. A researcher from The Jakarta Post completed the 
search in the month of March, when I was no longer present in Indonesia. The Jakarta Globe 
merely had an electronic archive which they were in the process of transforming to a new 
system, which made the collection process somewhat challenging. I was however allowed 
access to their internal system and went through CDs with PDF files containing electronic 
copies of the paper issues. To collect the articles from Kompas, I hired a translator who 
assisted me in doing an online search at the paper’s information centre. The articles were 
translated into English before I could start the analysing process.  
I included everything that was written relating to the 1965 massacres. In addition to news 
articles, my material consists of features, front pages, opinions, commentaries, editorials, 
reader’s views, et cetera. I find them all relevant for looking into how the 1965 massacres are 
covered in the Indonesian press today. Allowing a reader’s opinion and public debate into the 
paper says something about the space created for the issues, and placing the topic on the front 
page reveals how the particular newspaper’s editors weighs its importance. Reflecting on the 
type of articles and where the articles are placed in the papers is a part of the analysis. 
The total selection is 65 articles, whereof 28 from The Jakarta Globe, 22 from The Jakarta 
Post and 15 from Kompas.  
3.1.2 Newspapers: The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe and Kompas 
The Jakarta Post 
The Jakarta Post was started as collaboration between four Indonesian media under the 
urging of the Information Minister at the time and politician Jusuf Wanandi. After the first 
issue was printed in 1983, it spent several years with minimal advertisements and increasing 
circulation. In the beginning of the 1990s it began to take a more vocal pro-democracy point 
of view. The paper was one of the few Indonesian English-language dailies to survive the 
1997 Asian financial crisis and currently has a circulation of about 40,000. It also features 
both a Sunday and online edition. The paper is targeted at foreigners and educated 
Indonesians, although the middle-class Indonesian readership has increased. Noted for being a 
training ground for local and international reporters, The Jakarta Post has won several awards 
and been described as being "Indonesia's leading English-language daily". The newspaper is 
owned by PT Bina Media Tenggara. 
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The Jakarta Globe 
The Jakarta Globe is an English language daily launched in 2008. It is today the most-read 
newspaper in English in Indonesia, and is published six days a week. It is marketed primarily 
at cosmopolitan and well educated Indonesians and expatriates. It had three sections, and 
contains a range of general news, including metropolitan and national news coverage as well 
as international news, plus comment, Indonesian and world business and sport plus a 
classified advertising section, and features and lifestyle coverage as well as entertainment, 
listings and reader service and puzzle/cartoon pages. The newspaper has since added a 
Sunday and an online edition.  The newspaper's owner, PT Jakarta Globe Media, is part of the 
BeritaSatu Media Holdings that is an associated company of Lippo. 
Kompas 
Kompas is an Indonesian national newspaper established in 1965 and is published by Kompas 
Gramedia. The paper is distributed to all parts of Indonesia. With a circulation of an average 
of 500,000 copies per day and 600,000 for the Sunday edition, Kompas is not just the largest 
circulating printed media in Indonesia, but also it is the largest circulating newspaper in 
Southeast Asia. Its readership totals of approximately 2.25 million. 
The paper was first suggested by the then commander of the Indonesian army and was 
established as a newspaper that was representative of the Catholic Party faction, in order to 
counter the communist propaganda spearheaded by the PKI. Later the newspaper's mission 
was changed to become one that is independent and free from any political factions. 
Like many major daily newspapers, Kompas is divided into three principal parts: a front 
section containing national and international news, a business and finance section and a sports 
section. Kompas also manage an online portal (www.kompas.com), which contains updated 
news and the digital version of the paper.  
3.1.3 Interviews 
This thesis is however not merely aiming to find out what is being written in the press, but 
why it was written the way it is also on what is not being written and why. My research 
question presents an ambition to find out to what degree external restrictions and self-
censorship influences the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres. Finding out which formal 
restrictions that applies is fairly straight forward. A different matter completely is to find out 
how the coverage is influenced by informal restrictions and influences leading to self-
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censorship. To identify this I decided to ask journalists themselves, as well as their editors. I 
chose to do qualitative interviews rather than a survey because of the sensitivity and 
complexity of the issues to be discussed.  
 
The interview subjects were identified partly through purposeful sampling (Patton 1990 in 
Johannessen et al. 2010: 106). I decided I needed to speak with Indonesian press workers. I 
wished to speak with both senior journalists, who had also been working during the New 
Order regime, and younger journalists with only recent experience. As the journalists might 
write articles about the 1965/66 massacres, only to have them turned down by editorial 
decisions, I decided I also needed to speak with editors. I aimed to speak with some 
journalists who were authors of articles on my subject, but did not limit myself to this. This 
for two reasons: One, I was also interested to hear from journalists who did not write about 
these issues, but who worked with fields such as human rights issues, politics and defence, et 
cetera. Two was a practical reason. Due to limited time and resources I had merely three and a 
half weeks in Indonesia and thus had to work in parallel with collecting and reading the 
articles and conducting the interviews.   
 
I adopted the snowball method (Johannessen et al. 2010:109) to identify names of those to 
contact. I started off with contacting Indonesians I knew from various fields of work and 
asked if they had contacts within journalism or human rights. From there I contacted leads 
who recommended others for me to contact, et cetera. When leaving for Indonesia I had 
merely one scheduled interview, but quite a few names on my list that either already I had 
been in communication with or would get in contact with once I arrived in the country. 
After I started to collect articles I noted down the by-lines and contacted some of these 
journalists for interviews. More than once I received advice to contact journalists that I had 
already noted down on my list of interviewee prospects.  
I conducted in all 11 semi-structured interviews using an interview guide. However, the 
interviews varied because of the interviewees' different backgrounds, the contact made and 
the flow of conversation. All interviews lasted approximately one hour and were recorded. 
The recorded interviews were afterwards transcribed into text.  
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3.2 Quantitative and qualitative methods 
Data are rarely indisputable facts. There are different ways of collecting and analysing data, 
and there is a division between quantitative and qualitative methods. A quantitative approach 
is to count phenomena or to map distribution. A lot of the procedures for the quantitative 
method stem from a natural scientific method, but it is simultaneously adjusted to the fact that 
these are humans and human phenomena being studied. The qualitative method does however 
say something about the quality or specific characteristics of the phenomenon that is being 
analysed. Qualitative method is particularly appropriate if one is to investigate phenomena 
that are unfamiliar or has a desire to understand more in-depth (Johannesen et al., 2010:31).  
The method selected for this thesis is based on the research question, as well as time and 
financial resources. One way to collecting qualitative data is through interviews (Johannesen 
et al. 2010: 100), which I choose for this thesis. The interviews left me with the following 
data to analyse: Interview notes and recorded sound transcribed into text.   
 
My data included also 65 newspaper articles. Despite the rather small material, which was 
expected, I choose to do a quantitative analysis as well as qualitative. Standing alone the 
quantitative analysis will not have much value due to the limited number of articles. I do 
however find it relevant to analyse the written articles also quantitatively as I believe it can 
give some indications of common features, looking at the number of articles per month (how 
much space), which section the articles are placed in (priorities), whether or not the articles 
had accompanying photos (how visible), by-line (anonymous), sources (whose voice), 
thematic priorities (the issues raised). Thereafter, I will do a qualitative analysis to take the 
material further and go more into depth. I will firstly then be able to look more distinctly at 
possible patterns and move closer towards answering the research question for this thesis.  
Data from observations and interviews are not necessarily qualitative. If the data are 
registered in the form of countable categories, they are considered quantitative data 
(Johannesen et al. 2010: 100). I have not chosen to categorize the data from the interviews 
because of the low number of interviews. For this thesis, I choose to have few informants 
because I had a limited time frame and thus needed to ensure sufficient time to do thorough 
and in-depth interviews to bring out nuances that could contribute to a broader insight into the 
issues.   
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3.2.1 Qualitative interviews 
Interviews are the most common way of gathering qualitative data. It is a flexible method that 
can be used almost everywhere and enables full and detailed descriptions. If the theme is not 
sensitive or difficult, most informants will feel comfortable in an interview. Kvale and 
Brinkman (2009) characterise the qualitative research interview as a conversation with a 
structure and a purpose (Johannesen et al. 2010: 135). The structure is connected to the 
division of roles between the participants in the interview. The interviewer asks the questions, 
and the interviewee answers. As the interviewer controls the situation, the participants are not 
equal. The purpose is often to understand or describe something. Interviews are often more a 
dialogue than purely questions and answers (ibid).  
Kvale and Brinkman emphasize that the qualitative interview’s purpose is to elicit 
descriptions of the informants’ every-day world in order to be able to analyse the meaning of 
the phenomena described. One has to separate general research questions from the concrete 
questions asked in an interview (Johannesen et al. 2010: 136).  
The reason why interviews are often used – and why it is used for this thesis - is because 
social phenomena tend to be complex and through interviews it is possible to bring out 
complexity and nuances. For this thesis I have chosen interviews as a supplementary to the 
written newspaper articles, as I presume that approaching my research question from different 
angles will provide for a broader and more comprehensive answer. 
3.3 Evaluation of qualitative research 
In quantitative research reliability and validity are used as criteria for quality. Yin (2008) uses 
these terms also for qualitative data (Johannessen et al., 2010: 229). Others, like Guba and 
Lincoln (1985, 1989) think, however, that qualitative research must be evaluated differently, 
and operate with the terms trustworthiness, credibility, generality and conformability. A third 
option is presented by Johannessen et al. (2010:229), who claim that reliability and validity in 
some cases can be relevant also for qualitative research.  
The different tests for reliability in quantitative research are hardly useful for qualitative 
research. For qualitative research the researcher can however strengthen reliability or 
trustworthiness by giving the reader a thorough description of the context and an open, 
detailed presentation of the method for the entire research process (Johannessen et al. 2010: 
230). Validity in qualitative research is about to what extent the researcher’s methods and 
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findings accurately reflect the intention of the study and represent reality (ibid). Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) present two techniques that can increase the probability that the research leads to 
credible results. One is continuous observation, which is to invest enough time to get to know 
the field well so that one can differentiate between relevant and non-relevant information and 
build up trust (ibid). Triangulation is another. This means that the researcher uses a 
combination of different methods, which can enhance the validity of the analysis (Østbye et al. 
1997:101). For this thesis, triangulation is taking into use by analysing reference articles 
quantitatively and qualitatively and conducting qualitative interviews. 
Credibility can also be strengthened by informing the interviewees of the results to obtain 
confirmation, or by letting other competent persons analyse the same material to see if they 
reach the same conclusion (Johannesen et al., 2010: 230).  
The aim of all research is to draw conclusions beyond the immediate information that is 
collected. A study’s generality is about whether one is successful in establishing descriptions, 
terms, interpretations and explanations that are useful in other areas than that which is being 
analysed (Johannesen et al., 2010: 230). 
It is important that the findings be the result of the research and not the researcher’s subjective 
views, which the conformability is to ensure. Conformability is the equivalent of the 
objectivity criteria for the quantitative research. One can ensure this by describing all the 
decisions taken throughout the research process, so that the audience can follow and evaluate 
them. It is important to be self-critical and comment on previous experiences, variations, 
prejudices and perceptions which may influence the interpretation and approach to the project. 
Conformability can also be strengthened if the researcher considers whether the 
interpretations are supported by other literature, or if they are supported by the research 
interviewees (Johannesen et al., 2010: 231).  
3.4 Source critic   
Being critical of one’s own material is important to be able to identify possible limitations. In 
that way one can seek ways to avoid these and enhance the quality of the end result, or – if not 
possible - at least be aware of them and ensure transparency and allow the audience to know 
potential weaknesses of the research.  
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3.4.1 Reference articles 
Two of the three newspapers selected for this thesis are in English and Jakarta. These were 
selected primarily for practical reasons as I do not speak the Indonesian language. English-
language newspapers do necessarily have a more limited and different readership than those 
in the local language. These newspapers are read by the Indonesian middle class and elite, as 
well as the foreign elite living in the country, and the content is thus influenced by this as well 
as the fact that they are both Jakarta-based. The media content of these papers do not reach 
out to the majority of the Indonesian people. Therefore, I also chose to have an Indonesian-
language newspaper in the selection which has a much larger reach demographically as well 
as geographically speaking. By comparing these I will be able to perhaps identify some 
differences which may indicate something about the limitations of the end result. However, 
there are also newspapers that reaches out to more people at the grass-root level than also 
Kompas that could have resulted in an even broader understanding of the issues at hand. 
Another weakness could be that Kompas as an Indonesian-language newspaper had to be 
translated before I could start with the analysis. There could be meanings and nuances that 
were lost in translation and thus contributed to a lesser quality of the end-product. The 
translator was a professional who were recommended through work-relations, but despite the 
professionalism this could be a limiting factor.  
In addition, as mentioned in chapter 1, Indonesians are good at reading between the lines as a 
result of the writing style of the New Order era where messages were hidden in the articles. In 
the analysis I will look at whether this still takes place. Such hidden messages might thus be 
found in the reference articles which could be lost on me as a foreigner who are not 
accustomed to reading between the lines.  
3.4.2 Interviews 
As presented above I took into use the snowball method when selecting the interview objects. 
These are limited in numbers and they might not necessarily represent the majority views 
related to these issues. They may have experiences or opinions that are unique and individual 
and there might be others that would provide a better picture and understanding of the issues 
for this thesis. I attempted to mitigate this by ensuring a variety within the selection of 
interview objects, both in terms of age and gender and also to include both journalists and 
editors. In addition I added a non-professional media worker, the documentary maker who 
will thus have a view of journalism more from the outside.  
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For many years the issue of the 1965 massacres was taboo in Indonesia. It is still a sensitive 
topic to discuss openly. In addition, it might be very personal for many.  It can therefore be 
challenging to interview Indonesians on this particular topic. Whether the interviewed 
subjects were completely open or not is hard to say with one hundred per cent certainty. There 
were also people who declined to speak with me on this particular topic, either directly or 
indirectly via others. Those who declined my interview invitations explained that they either 
lacked experience of this particular issue and had little to say, or suggested other people 
whom they considered more relevant or knowledgeable. In addition, there were also others 
still who did not have the time or were out of town, et cetera.  
In addition, there are differences between the Norwegian and Indonesian cultures. This might 
have led to misinterpretations or an environment of lesser trust between the interviewer and 
interviewees. The Indonesians are also part of an Asian culture where ‘losing face’ is a factor, 
and for this reason some tend to shy away from critical conversations on their own or others’ 
behalf. However, as the interview subjects are media workers, this might be less of a factor 
than possibly for other working groups, as media workers themselves are preoccupied with 
critical questions and underlying truths.  
Language may also be a cause of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. This goes both 
for the interviews, but also for the translated articles as I am not able to understand the 
Indonesian language.  Many of my interviewees are however working for English-speaking 
newspapers and are thus more advanced in English than most Indonesians and I used a 
professional to translate the articles. 
Due to time and resources I had only a limited amount of time in Indonesia. Towards the end 
of my stay, I did have leads that I would have liked to follow up but was unable to. However, 
knowing at what point one has sufficient material might always be a problem, especially when 
one gets engaged and is eager to learn more, even if this might not be necessary for the results 
of the analysis.  
The time limitation also obliged me to simultaneously gather the articles and conduct the 
interviews. In a perfect world I would have preferred to have a long enough stay to collect, go 
through and analyse the articles before conducting the interviews.  
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3.5 Ethical considerations 
As mentioned, the issue of the 1965/66 massacres is still sensitive to discuss after years of 
being completely taboo in Indonesian society. Many still fear possible consequences of 
talking openly. For a lot of people it is also deeply personal. Many had relatives who were 
killed, detained or stigmatized for allegedly sympathizing with the Communist Party. Others 
have strong beliefs one way or the other after years of indoctrination and propaganda. It is 
therefore not straight forward to come as a foreigner and start asking questions about these 
issues. Ethical considerations were in the back of my mind throughout the process of working 
on this master’s thesis. I attempted to approach prospective interview subjects gently, without 
too bluntly asking about the 1965/66 massacres. I tried to lead into it by starting to talk about 
freedom of expression and sensitive issues in general, but ensured that I was always clear 
about the fact that it was the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres I was particularly interested 
in.  
I made sure to send out written information via email before every interview, even those I had 
arranged by phone, to ensure that the interviewees had all necessary information before the 
meeting took place. During the interview I tried to take my time and build up trust before 
asking direct questions that might be uncomfortable if the interviewee had any personal 
experiences or fears of reprisals for being too outspoken. I tried to conduct the interviews in 
settings they were comfortable with and was flexible when they suggested the meeting place. 
If we met in public places, I ensured that we did not sit too close to other people. I recorded 
the interviews after consent, and placed the recorder so that it was visible. I made it very clear 
when I turned it on and off.  
I offered all my interview subjects anonymity. This for security reasons, but also to allow for 
a safe environment where they could be completely open and honest. Only one out of the 
eleven wanted to remain anonymous. This person had chosen to remain anonymous after co-
producing the film, The Act of Killing, for security reasons, and I never knew his name. 
Because of a volcano eruption and a closed airport, I did not actually meet him in person and 
the interview was conducted via Skype. This was the only interview which was not carried 
out face-to-face. 
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3.6 Analysis build-up 
The question I am aiming to answer through this analysis is: How does the Indonesian press 
cover the 1965/66 massacres today, and to what degree is the coverage influenced by external 
restrictions and self-censorship? 
It is a two-part question, with the first asking how the Indonesian press covers the 1965/66 
massacres today. To help me find the answer I will look into the extent to which the topic is 
prioritized in the selected newspapers. I will look into the number of articles as well as which 
sections they are placed under and whether they have connected photos to enhance their 
visibility amidst other media content.   
Thereafter I will look into who raises the topic of the 1965/66 massacres and who are the 
sources in the reference articles. This is to present an overview over the participants of the 
public debate on the issue, which I see as important background for the further discussions.  
The use of by-line may also reveal something about the sensitivity and security situation 
relating the 1965/66 massacres. 
I will then get into the question on which issues that are raised in the articles. I have chosen 
the following five thematic categories, and all the articles are placed in one or more of these.  
1. Truth and reconciliation  
2. Moving on and letting go 
3. Academy Award nomination and film production 
4. Understanding the massacres 
5. Communism / anti-communism 
6. Freedom of speech / propaganda 
I will also look into how the relevant stakeholders and communism as an ideology were 
described in the reference articles to see if the indoctrinated perceptions imposed by the New 
Order were still valid in today’s Indonesia. I will look into the perceptions of:  
1. Communists and communism  
2. The Indonesian Government and politicians 
3. The Indonesian Military 
4. Anti-communists and radical Islamic groups 
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The second part of my research question is to what degree is the coverage of the 1965/66 
massacres is influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. To answer this I will also 
look beyond the written material and ask journalists and editors if and how they experience 
formal and informal restrictions in their journalistic practise.  
4. Analysis 
4.1 The space, priority and visibility of articles about the 1965/66 massacres 
I will start the analysis by presenting the reference articles and looking at how many articles 
relating the 1965/66 massacres in the selected time period appeared in The Jakarta Post, The 
Jakarta Globe and Kompas. This will give an indication of the space and priority the topic 
was given in the selected papers. In addition I will present which sections these articles were 
to be found in and if photos were attached. The latter may say something about how visible 
the articles were to the reader in the midst of the other media content. Together these factors 
can give an indication of the importance attributed to the topic in the selected papers.   
As mentioned above all the publications are called ‘reference articles’ as a common term 
throughout this thesis, whether they were opinion pieces or commentaries, front pages, feature 
stories, or news articles. Merely when relevant are they specified to be news articles or 
opinion pieces, et cetera. In section 4.1.2 I will present an overview in what sections the 
articles appeared and thus the distribution of the selection of ‘articles’ will be visible to the 
reader.  
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4.1.1 Number of reference articles  
The above graph shows the number of articles in The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe and Kompas for each 
month in the time period from September 2013 to March 2014.   
In the selected time period from September 2013 to March 2014, there were altogether 65 
articles relating to the issues of the 1965/66 massacres in the three papers The Jakarta Post, 
The Jakarta Globe and Kompas. As the massacres took place nearly fifty years back in time 
and are in themselves not news to most Indonesians, this can be said to be a significant 
number. The news coverage of a particular topic will at all times depend on the broader media 
picture and current events, and what makes it into the news does thus have an aspect of 
randomness to it. That 2014 was an election year in Indonesia is assumed to have affected 
how much space were allocated to other issues, and the main focus in the reference articles 
were on issues connected with the elections particularly from January onwards. The amount 
of coverage of the 1965/66 events is thus considered with that in mind.  
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There are some variations relating to what extent the three papers cover the 1965/66 
massacres. The Jakarta Globe had the largest number of articles about the topic in the 
selected time period (28 articles). The Jakarta Post had 22 articles had Kompas a mere 15 
articles.  The selected time frame is, as mentioned, short and this does not necessarily mean 
that The Jakarta Globe or The Jakarta Post in general cover this topic more often than 
Kompas, but it suggests that this may be the case. Kompas is the only Indonesian-language 
newspaper in the selection, which raises the question if the topic is more easily covered by 
English-language newspapers. As presented above The Jakarta Post and The Jakarta Globe 
have a different readership, namely the Indonesian middle class and elite as well as the 
foreign population.  Kompas has a much wider reach, both in terms of numbers and 
demographics. Whether there are other reasons why Kompas publishes fewer articles on this 
topic than the two others in the selection will be part of later discussions in this thesis. 
4.1.2 Sections and photos  
 
The above graph shows which sections the reference articles were organized in in the three newspapers The 
Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe and Kompas 
The sections the articles were organized in in the newspaper gives an indication of the 
editorial priorities. The 1965/66 massacres took place nearly fifty years ago, which attenuates 
35 
 
their newsworthiness or sensational element. However, there may be new developments or 
utterances that increase the news angle. In the selected time period The Jakarta Globe 
allocated two front pages to the 1965/66 issues. One of them was accompanied by a photo of 
the then Indonesian president and the text said ‘Time to Move On? Indonesia marks Pancasila 
Sanctity Day as it tries to redress history’ (The Jakarta Globe, January 24th, 2014).  The other 
headlined the word ‘Jagal’ in bold letters, which is the Indonesian title of the documentary 
The Act of Killing and the text across the front page said: ‘Coming to Terms With the Past. 
Global spotlight: Oscar nomination for ‘The Act of Killing’ sparks soul-searching about 
1960s anti-communist purge’ (The Jakarta Globe, October 30th, 2013). Approximately half 
the number of articles in The Jakarta Globe can be found under the news section. This is also 
the case for Kompas. The Jakarta Post has a rather low number of their articles in the news 
section and the majority are opinion pieces or commentaries. 
 
 The above graph shows the number of reference articles that had photos attached   
In total for all three newspapers, approximately half of the articles had photos attached. The 
Jakarta Globe had slightly more photos as part of their publications of the 1965/66 massacres 
than The Jakarta Post and Kompas. This may merely have more to do with the newspaper's 
policy of publishing more photos in general. Tapsell (in Asian Studies Review June 2012:234) 
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describes The Jakarta Globe as ‘a glossy, full-colour English-language daily’, which may 
indicate that photos are commonly used in the paper. However, the use of photos does 
increase the visibility of an article and may thus indicate that the issue of the 1965/66 
massacres was more visible to the reader in The Jakarta Globe than the other two newspapers. 
The variations amongst the three papers were however so small that it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions from this.  
4.1.3 Concluding remarks 
The fact that there were in all 65 articles in the selected seven-month period on issues relating 
to the 1965/66 massacres, does indicate that the events which took place almost fifty years 
ago are still relevant for Indonesians today. A large number of the articles are also found in 
the newspapers' news sections and a few front pages were even devoted to the topic. The topic 
thus seems to be a priority amongst other media content and as half the articles had attached 
photos, the topic appears to have been given space and was visible to readers.  
There are variations between the newspapers published in English and Indonesian in the 
selection. This may indicate that the topic was considered more sensitive by Kompas than the 
two English-language newspapers which draw their readerships primarily from the Jakarta-
based middle class and elite. I will be looking more into this also in the following discussions, 
particularly in relation to self-censorship and political and commercial influences.  
4.2 Who are the voices?  
Looking into who gave voice to the issues of the 1965/66 massacres is an important part of 
the analysis. There are several aspects to consider. First of all, who were the sources for the 
articles? As stated above in chapter 1 the Indonesian government’s version of the events that 
took place in 1965/66 was the only one during the New Order period. This version was 
propagated through the media and voices with stories not in line with the ruling opinion were 
silenced. The issue of the 1965/66 was taboo even in general society and many relatives of 
victims were not even aware of their family history until recently. Today public space is 
formally open for discussions of the topic, and in this analysis I am attempting to look into the 
level of openness and who is utilising public space to voice their thoughts and opinions. To do 
so, I have looked into not only their sources, but also who raised the topic in the first place.  In 
addition to being important as background, the use of by-lines may also say something about 
the sensitivity and security situation relating to public writing about the 1965/66 massacres.  
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4.2.1 By-lines 
 
The above graph shows the number of the reference articles that carry by-lines and whether the by-lines belong 
to Indonesians, foreigners or Indonesians living abroad. 
As seen from the graph above there were quite a few articles that did not carry by-lines. This 
may potentially say something about sensitivity to the issue of the 1965/66 massacres. 
According to some of those interviewed for this thesis, omitting by-lines was a security 
precaution. Others, however, stated that it was merely a practical matter. In Kompas the by-
line ‘Tim Kompas’ (Team Kompas) was sometimes used instead of the name or names of 
contributing journalists. In the article selection it is also evident that merely using the 
journalist's initials rather than their full name is quite common in Kompas. This is not the case 
for the other two papers in the selection. I will come back to this topic of security in section 
4.5 and discuss in more detail the interviewees’ notions relating to the security situation.  
Most of the articles did however reveal the names of the journalists or the readers voicing 
their comments and opinions. Most of those who wrote the articles were, as expected, 
Indonesians. However, there were several foreigners behind some of these articles. The 
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English-language newspapers, The Jakarta Post and The Jakarta Globe, did and do have 
some foreigners on their staff. In addition there were readers from countries like Australia and 
the United States that wrote opinion pieces. In addition, there were several Indonesians living 
abroad who contributed their opinions to the debate. Some of these were correspondents in 
other countries, but most seemed to belong to the Indonesian diaspora.  
In the Kompas article, ‘Going Back Home’, (November 11th, 2013) a social worker and 
alumnus of the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague in Holland, Bambang Sipayung, 
wrote about the Indonesian diaspora and their interest in getting involved in re-writing 
Indonesian history and in particular the ‘often-concealed G30S’. Most of the Indonesians in 
Europe and South America were students sent by Sukarno to study in socialist-communist 
countries as part of a plan to educate experts to help build Indonesia. Under the New Order 
regime, Indonesians abroad were forced to choose whether to support of and state their loyalty 
to the regime or to lose their citizenship due to their ideological or political beliefs. These 
exiles were referred to by former President Abdurrahman Wahid as ‘the roaming children of 
the state’. According to the article, many showed a strong bond with their homeland and 
engaged in these debates about the past.  
4.2.2 Sources 
 
The above graph shows the use of single or multiple sources in the reference articles in The Jakarta Post, The 
Jakarta Globe and Kompas  
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The above graph shows the distribution of sources in the reference articles according to type, categorized in 
seven groups. 
A large number of the reference articles are opinion pieces or commentaries. Thus they were 
merely the voice of the individual journalist, editor or reader. If not an opinion piece or a 
commentary, most of the articles had multiple sources. The majority of these sources 
belonged to civil society, including non-governmental organizations, activists and historians. 
Some of them appeared in several of the articles and seemed to be very active in conveying 
their messages and were easily accessible to the journalists.  This category also contained the 
anti-communism activists and Islamic activists.  
There were a very few sources from the government or political elite. This is worth noting 
since the majority of the articles referred to the need for the government to assume 
responsibility for taking some sort of action relating to the 1965/66 massacres. One particular 
statement given by the President’s spokesperson after the release of The Act of Killing, was 
referred to in many of the reference articles. According to some of the interviewees, the elite 
sources were often difficult to reach for a statement to the press. Margareth Aritonang from 
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The Jakarta Post stated that she attempted to get a comment from one of the ministers after 
the release of the Komnas Ham report in 2012, and was dismissed with a question aimed at 
her asking if she would have let the communists take over if she had been part of the 
government in 1965 (from an interview on February 24
th
, 2014). The absence of sources 
particularly from government officials, politicians and military men will be further discussed 
in the analysis in chapter 4.  
The graph above shows a high number of sources from lower-level state institutions and may 
thus be said to be somewhat misrepresentative as the lower-level officials are grouped 
together with the elite politicians and government representatives, et cetera. The most quoted 
among the state officials were members of the national human rights commission, Komnas 
HAM. In 2012, the commission presented its report after investigating the 1965/66 massacres, 
and stated that the massacres were ‘a gross human rights violation’ (in article ‘New lease on 
life for probe into 1965 anti-communist purge’ in The Jakarta Post, September 30th, 2013). 
Their recommendations to the government on steps forward to resolve the issues of the 
1965/66 massacres are yet to be followed by the time of the submission of this thesis.  
The victims and victims' families were also well represented as sources in the reference 
articles. Their identities were only partially revealed as ‘Maria (68)’ or ‘Arifin (72)’. They 
were categorized as ‘victims and victims’ families’ since it is clear that they belonged to this 
group and are only partially anonymous. Several of these sources were quoted after gatherings 
of victims and victims’ families and shared stories their experiences. In many of the articles 
the journalists merely referred to presentations given during these gatherings and did not 
conduct additional interviews with the victims and their families. The article ‘Putu’s Word 
Remains Mighty’ (The Jakarta Globe 13.11.13) offers a more in-depth story by a victim of 
the 1965/66 events, who were jailed for ten years as a political prisoner.   
There were few sources from the film industry, which shows that articles and discussions 
about the documentary The Act of Killing were mainly concerned with the content and not 
film production or technical aspects. 
4.2.3. Concluding remarks 
It is worth noting the low number of government sources and sources from the political sphere 
in general, not to mention from the police and military forces. These were all key stakeholders 
in the debate, but their voices were significantly absent. Often statements by government 
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officials were referred to in several of the articles instead of being exclusive to the respective 
articles and were thus often less relevant for the specific questions raised in the articles. This 
will also be further discussed in section 4.5.  
The notable absence of government and political sources combined with the very high number 
of sources from civil society suggests that the public debate on the issue is at this stage rather 
one-sided. It suggests that there is less discussion than advocacy by non-governmental 
organizations, activists and historians who are trying to create political interest and a will to 
take action. This will be further discussed in section 4.3 which deals with the issues raised in 
the articles.  
As seen above, most of the collected publications carry by-lines, but quite a large percentage 
of them, however, do not reveal who the writer was. There were variations in the explanations 
by the journalists why this was so, but most stated this was more a practical matter than a 
concern for security. It is interesting also to note the large percentage of contributions to the 
public debate from foreigners and Indonesians living abroad. This may be connected to the 
selection's larger number of articles published in the English-language newspapers, and 
perhaps indicate that distance to the real events might have made it easier to part-take in terms 
of both emotions and the notion of security. I will come back to the latter later in the analysis. 
42 
 
4.3 Issues raised in the articles about the 1965/66 massacres 
The above graph shows the number of reference articles in The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe and Kompas 
categorized by themes according to which issues they raise. All the reference articles are categorized under one 
or several of the themes.  
 
Since the 1965/66 massacres happened almost fifty years ago, they are not news to most 
Indonesians. However, since the topic has been censored and silenced for so long there might 
be elements of news to the story despite the time passed since the events took place. There 
have also been developments and utterances over the past years that have increased the 
relevance of the topic and thus led to media coverage. Amongst these is the formal 
investigation into the events and the report published by the national human rights committee, 
Komnas Ham, in 2012 and the release of the documentary The Act of Killing the same year. 
Within the selected time frame for this thesis the nomination of The Act of Killing for an 
Academy Award was a new development that caught the media’s attention. In the following I 
will present what content the various articles in the reference articles discussed, which is 
highly relevant for a comprehensive analysis of coverage of the 1965/66 massacres. Some of 
17 
0 
7 
4 
3 3 
14 
2 
3 
2 2 
3 
5 
2 2 2 
3 3 
36 
4 
12 
8 8 
9 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Truth and
reconciliation
Let go and move
on
Award
nomination and
film production
Understanding
the massacres
Communism/
anti-communism
Freedom of
expression /
propaganda
Themes 
Jakarta Globe
Jakarta Post
Kompas
Total
43 
 
the articles carry similar messages, and I have categorized the content in six themes as 
described above in chapter 3 and presented in the graph below. In the following I will discuss 
the number of articles categorized under the various themes, as well as the content of the 
themes. All of the articles are categorized under these themes, and some are categorized under 
more than one if they were hard to categorize or brought up several parallel issues. 
4.3.1 Truth and Reconciliation 
A vast majority of the reference articles dealt thematically with the importance of seeking 
truth and reconciliation. This can also be seen in the use of sources, many of which were non-
governmental organisations, historians and activists working towards this aim, as well as 
victims and victims’ families sharing their stories to convey the truth.  
There is a lot of variation in this category, and there are many meanings of the terms ‘truth’ 
and ‘reconciliation’ in these articles. Many of the articles and interviewees concluded that the 
full story and complete truth about what happened in 1965/66 would remain a question mark 
in history because so much time has passed. Most of those who knew all the details are no 
longer alive. However, further investigations and the search for more pieces to the puzzle 
were requested by many in the articles selected. For many, ‘truth’ means that those who know 
and continue to try and disclose information should come forward and share their knowledge. 
‘Truth’ also refers to openness and honesty in the public debate and civil conversations about 
this topic. Several of the articles also talked of the need for re-writing history books and 
educational material. It is worth noting that very few brought up the issue of the legal 
prosecutions of perpetrators and those responsible. ‘Reconciliation’ is however a much used 
term in the article selection. What this refers to seems however to differ. Some of the articles 
referred to Nelson Mandela and the South African reconciliation model. The article 
“Indonesia Not Yet Ready to Come to Terms with 1965” in The Jakarta Globe mentioned this 
and stated that with next year’s 50th anniversary for the massacres and with Nelson Mandela’s 
passing, Indonesia is under a ‘harsh spotlight’ and needs to take action (Jakarta Globe, March 
3
rd
, 2014). The article refers to the report by the national human rights committee Komnas 
HAM from 2012, where one of the recommendations was to establish a truth and 
reconciliation committee. To date, this has not been followed up. In the article ‘New lease on 
life for probe into 1965 anti-communist purge’ in The Jakarta Post (September 30th 2013), the 
follow-up of the report was discussed. According to the article, the commission and the 
attorney general’s office would jointly set up an investigation team following a complete 
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deadlock after the report was launched. The spokesperson for the attorney general’s office 
was not available for comments, but a member of the House of Representatives stated that she 
encouraged the President to issue a presidential decree to rehabilitate the rights of the 
survivors after 1965. In her mind, this would be ‘a win-win solution’ as the survivors would 
be willing to forgive mistakes from the past as they ‘only want their rights rehabilitated and 
their descendants officially cleared of stigma’. The article's journalist, Margareth Aritonang, 
opened the article by saying that the survivors ‘could finally receive justice’ if this were to 
happen and stated that the intention of a joint investigation would bring hope for a solution. 
During the interview for this thesis in February 22
nd
, 2014, Aritonang was however less 
hopeful for a resolution any time soon, and stated:  
“…our government does nothing to clarify whether what Komnas HAM did find was actually 
right or wrong. No, they just put it (the report) in the cupboard and then just closed it and do 
nothing”. 
She fears the consequences of the inaction of the political leadership on the 1965/66 issues as 
she believes this nurtures hatred amongst the many victims which might lead to rebellion or 
other unrest. All the interviewees are in agreement that there is a need for resolution, but none 
of them believe this will happen any time soon. They all refer to the fact that those 
responsible are still in power and running the country. A frequently cited example is that the 
father-in-law of the President at the time of the interviews, General Sarwo Edhie, was the 
leader of the Indonesian Military’s Special Forces (Kopassus) and thus led the anti-
communist campaign in 1965/66. In an interview quoted by several of the interviewees, he 
was asked to confirm if half a million was the correct number of people killed during the 
purge, to which he replied: ‘Are you kidding me? It is three million!’ 
Several of the interviewees believe that the current power-holders need to pass away before 
anything will be resolved, and the next generation will be responsible for reconciling the 
nation. This was also a common view in the articles. In the article ‘1965 Massacres Remain a 
Divisive Issue’ in The Jakarta Globe (October 10th, 2013) by journalist Dessy Sagita, one of 
the sources stated that it is unlikely that the government will be willing to reveal the truth. 
‘Some of those people who were responsible for the tragedy are still here, they are still 
enjoying their existence, and the 1965 tragedy is a dark secret they don’t want anyone to 
know about because it could jeopardize their comfortable positions. [They were so] 
unbelievably brutal and sadistic that I do not think they could bare the shame’  
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In 2010 the then President attempted to offer an apology to the victims and victims’ families. 
However he did not apologize on behalf of the government, but on behalf of the organisation, 
Nahdluha Ulama, to which he belonged. Some claim this is was what brought about his fall 
from power.  
Many of the presidential candidates during the elections in July 2014 were of the older 
generation. According to writer Putu Oka Sukanta, who was in jail for ten years for affiliation 
with the communist party, the candidates were ‘sons of Soharto in soul and spirit’ (The 
Jakarta Globe, November 13
th
, 2013). He was imprisoned without a trial and did not receive 
any explanation, apology or compensation from the government after his release. He says that 
‘events of 1965 may seem a long time ago, but many are still feeling the repercussions’. 
Stigmatization is still very real for former detainees or alleged communists. Former political 
detainees must for instance carry an identification card and cannot work as civil servants or 
school teachers. Thus, removing the social stigma and in this way bringing justice to the 
victims and their families are, for many, part and parcel of the term 'reconciliation'. 
Compensating them for their loss is another demand by some of the voices in the reference 
articles. 
In an article in The Jakarta Globe of February 8
th
 2014, disappointment was expressed over 
the fact that addressing human rights crimes from the past has been largely absent in the 
presidential election campaigns. This is according to the article ‘not an issue that should be 
swept under the carpet, but one that should take front and centre stage in the debate’.  It said 
further that hundreds of thousands are waiting for truth and justice after Indonesia’s many 
past conflicts, such as the events of 1965/66. ‘Addressing past crimes would contribute to 
healing the open wounds and go a long way toward ending the general mistrust people across 
the country will feel towards authorities and the judiciary, as long as the complete impunity 
for serious human rights violations remains’. The article claimed that the province of Ache 
should serve as an example where the Ache Truth and Reconciliation bylaw was passed in 
2013, calling for the establishment of a truth commission after the Ache conflict that ended in 
2005.  
The second public official to offer an apology, after President Wahid as described above, was 
the mayor of Palu. He apologized on behalf of the Palu administration to the survivors and to 
the families of those who died in 1965/66 (The Jakarta Post, October 25
th
, 2013). The mayor 
is from the Golkar party, which was the main party in power in 1965/66, and is also a former 
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chairman of the Pancasila Youth, which is even today warning against communism. The 
mayor says that he was guilty too, and admits that in 1966 he was told by the military to guard 
suspected communists who were gathered in a square. ‘I guarded them with my boy scout 
stick’, he said in the article. The main reason for his apology was however the desire not to 
leave the burden of history to the next generation. As a regional leader he gave his residents 
compensations in the form of scholarships, health insurance and equal opportunities for 
careers and politics. In the article ‘Truth and justice for the 1965 victims’ a human rights 
activist and daughter of a 1965 victim, referred to the mayor's apology: ‘We know that human 
rights tribunals are unlikely. But a public apology like the one made by the mayor helped a lot’ 
(The Jakarta Post, December 17
th
, 2013). 
Another reading of the term ‘reconciliation’ was presented in a Kompas article titled ‘30 
September 1965 – Encouraging Reconciliation and Mutual Forgiveness’ (Kompas, December 
10
th
, 2013). The article talked of an ‘organic reconciliation’ which, according to one of the 
voices in the article, is on-going. The article dealt with a book launch by the Islamic 
organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. In speeches the leadership of the Islamic group highlighted 
that members of Nahdlatul Ulama were also victims of ‘bloody 30 September’, which was 
‘the continuation of the PKI rebellion of 1948 that destabilised Indonesia’. The important next 
step was, according to these Islamic leaders, to encourage mutual forgiveness and ‘organic 
reconciliation’. It was stated that the elders of the organization ‘deeply regretted conflict, 
violence and murders’ and emphasized that the clash between the group and PKI happened ‘to 
save the great country of Indonesia’.  
4.3.2 Letting go and moving on 
The article ‘If Democracy Gets Tired’ warns against reconciliation (in Kompas, January 1st, 
2014). Interviewee Salim Said of the Defence University in Jakarta stated: 
We should not formally seek for reconciliation. Any formal statement of peace will instead 
provoke. Trauma is not fully resolved in all parties. Let this process organically proceed 
among those who are enlightened. Slowly, this awareness spreads and erases the grudge 
embedded inside. 
This article is categorized in ‘Letting go and moving on’. Few of the references are 
categorized under this theme compared to the much larger number of voices arguing for the 
opposite.   
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The statements from the few government sources represented in the reference articles may be 
said to resemble the aforementioned understanding of an ‘organic reconciliation’. A statement 
referred to in several of the articles was made by Coordination Minister for Political and 
Security Affairs, Djoko Suyanto, after the release of the Komnas HAM report in 2012: ‘We 
cannot apologize without taking a good look at what really happened during the 1965 incident’ 
(The Jakarta Globe, October 1
st
, 2013). According to Priyo Budi Santoso, a representative 
from the Golkar party, Indonesians should ‘just forget about it, and move on’. Santoso 
continued by stating that ‘there is no use in pursuing it. We have many other issues to deal 
with’. 
Journalist for The Jakarta Post, Margareth Aritonang, said in an interview (February 22
nd
, 
2014) they she did not know if the Government refused to take action because they did not 
care or they were afraid: ‘It would bring big changes to the course of our history, you know. 
Many people will be impacted, and they are just not ready to deal with the changes that might 
happen’. 
The anonymous co-director of The Act of Killing, challenged the media on their attempts to 
balance the views in articles about 1965/66. He claimed that the Indonesian media hide 
behind their ethical standards and ideal of objectivity by including the Government’s untrue 
versions when reporting the truth about the events. In that way, the media is in his opinion 
‘balancing a lie’ as if there were more than one correct version (shared in an interview March 
2014). According to this analysis, this is however not the case as most of the articles 
presented differing views from the Government’s and government officials were to a large 
degree absent as sources.  
4.3.3 Academy Award nomination and film production 
A lot of the reference articles mentioned the documentary The Act of Killing. Few of these, 
however, have been categorized under the theme ‘Award nomination and film production’ 
because the main contents of the articles were rarely the film in itself, but other issues related 
to the 1965/66 events. Though, a few of them were primarily about the film, and all three 
papers covered the nomination for the Academy Award for Best Documentary. The article in 
Kompas distanced itself from the two others in The Jakarta Post and The Jakarta Globe.  It 
was titled ‘Oscar nomination for The Act of Killing', and two film experts were interviewed 
about the quality of the documentary (Kompas, January 18
th
, 2014).  A documentary 
filmmaker and lecturer at the Jakarta Institute of Arts stated that a documentary film about 
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history should be balanced, and, he believes ‘there should be more in-depth and 
comprehensive research so that the movie does not come across as unfairly accusatory and 
incriminating’. Another film study expert and lecturer at the Jakarta Institute of Arts claimed 
in the same article that the movie clearly represented the perspectives of a foreigner and said 
that the film was ‘certainly subjective’. Both film experts stated that The Act of Killing could 
possibly be ‘a smear campaign against Indonesia’  
 
4.3.4 Understanding the massacres 
There is noticeable repetition in the various articles about the 1965/66 massacres and across 
the different newspapers in the selection. As mentioned above, some sources were used 
repeatedly, particularly those from a few historians and human rights activists. The same 
statements from public officials are referred to in various articles and several of the articles 
deal with the same events. It is not uncommon for the media anywhere to cover the same 
events or have a certain herd mentality, however it is worth mentioning that several of the 
articles do seem to scratch the surface rather than go into detail about the issue of the 1965/66 
massacres. The vast majority of the articles, as mentioned above, demand some sort of action 
to achieve truth and reconciliation. A few articles go into more detail to explain why the 
events that took place. Those articles where explanation and understanding seem to be the 
authors' main thrust, are categorized under ‘Understanding the massacres’.  Several of these 
present something additional to the more common narratives found in the majority of the 
article selection, which provides a broader picture of the massacres. “Documentary Director 
Hope the US will Admit its Role in Genocide” (The Jakarta Globe, March 3rd, 2014), for 
example, highlighted the United States' role in the events.  In the article “Why Indonesian 
President Should Rehabilitate the Late Subandrio” the author explained in-depth how former 
President Subanrio was accused and punished for being involved in the alleged coup d’état, 
and provided details about later findings (The Jakarta Globe, February 2
nd
, 2014). In “Going 
Back Home” the author explained the causes for there being a large percentage of the 
Indonesian diaspora living abroad (Kompas, November 11
th
, 2014).  
4.3.5 Communism / anti-communism 
There are few articles categorized also under ‘Communism / anti-communism’. Most articles 
did not go into detail about communism as an ideology or its status today (or even back then). 
Some articles did, however, deal with anti-communist protests and demonstrations by radical 
groups that occurred at the time. I will discuss these articles further in section 4.4.1 which 
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deals with the current perceptions of communists and whether there are still remains of 
communists portrayed as the common enemy in today’s press as they were during the New 
Order era.  
4.3.6 Freedom of speech and propaganda 
The freedom to publicly discuss the 1965/66 massacres and propaganda as reasons for a lot of 
wrongdoing in the past were underlying themes in many of the articles, however only a few 
are categorized under ‘Freedom of speech and propaganda’, as these topics were not the main 
theme in most articles. An article in The Jakarta Globe ‘The Act of Killing' Skirts Censors 
with Online Download’ (October 10th, 2013) explained how the documentary was never 
banned, but neither officially released in Indonesian theatres. The producers made the film 
available to the public by offering it free via an online download and thus avoided the issue of 
censorship. Human Rights Watch summed up the status of human rights in Indonesia in 
another article (‘Indonesia Still Weak on Human Rights’, The Jakarta Globe, January 23rd, 
2014) noting that ‘the government had acted positively toward ending the national taboo on 
discussing the purge of suspected members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI) in 1965 and 1966, by allowing limited screenings of The Act of Killing. 
Other articles, however, mentioned the police banning screenings of the documentary 
following protests from anti-communist and radical religious groups, and there were 
discussions about whether the police should rather have protected the film-goers from the 
protesters than banning the documentary screenings. This may also be seen in connection to 
several articles dealing with violent protests against gatherings by victims of the 1965/66 
events and their families. In ‘Freedom of Assembly – Ex-prisoners Gathering was Forcefully 
Dissolved’ (Kompas, October 28th, 2013) it was reported how a radical anti-communist group 
prevented ex-prisoners from gathering whilst the police stood by and did not protect their 
right to assembly. I will get back to this also in section 4.4.4 which deals with perceptions of 
the anti-communist and radical religious groups.  
4.3.6 Concluding remarks 
The above support the findings in 4.2 which suggest that the 1965/66 debate as reflected in 
the selected newspapers had more to do with advocacy and political influence than a two-
sided discussion. The vast majority of the reference articles dealt thematically with the need 
for truth and reconciliation requiring political action. In many of the articles the aim seemed 
to be to raise awareness and momentum in the population to influence the political power-
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holders to find the truth and take steps towards reconciliation. Others challenged the political 
level more directly. Kitley (2008:221), as mentioned under chapter 2, found that the 
government and other state institutions are frequently criticised in Indonesian media (in 
Tapsell in Asian Studies Review June 2012:227). This analysis supports this, however 
suggests that the critique is somewhat moderate.  The critique found in the reference articles 
were often formulated in quite general terms and seldom with any demands aimed at specific 
government officials or politicians. The President was at times targeted and called upon to 
assume responsibility for taking action, however few other representatives were specifically 
mentioned by name. This suggests a certain weariness in the press community vis-à-vis the 
power-holders and politicians and that the Indonesian press are somewhat cautious relating to 
holding the ruling power accountable and fully taking on the role as a ‘watchdog’. This 
supports the findings  of analysis by Pintak and Setiyono (2010:1) and Tapsell (in Asian 
Studies Review June 2012:227), as presented in chapter 2. This will be further discussed 
relating to restrictions on freedom of speech and self-censorship in section 4.5.    
4.4 Old perceptions in a new context? Perceptions of 1965/66 stakeholders then and now 
As presented in chapter 1, a heavy propaganda machine was put into place in the initial phases 
of the New Order era (Roosa, 2006, Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009, Hill, 2007). The 
media were taken under control, and the only version of the attempted coup d’état and the 
following anti-communist purge in 1965/66 was the official state one. As mentioned in 
section 2, controlling the media as a source of information distribution was one of the main 
ways for the propagandists to control information flows (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012: 46). 
Towards the end of New Order the media changed in the wake of the mutating financial 
situation in the region, and a more politically independent press gradually emerged. With the 
downfall of Suharto’s regime formal press freedom was eventually granted. Many of the 
military and political power-holders from the New Order regime did however remain, and 
some are still involved in the country's highest political levels. The question thus stands as to 
what extent there are still remnants of propaganda and attempts to influence public debate on 
this particular issue. Informal restrictions of free debate about the 1965/66 topic will be 
further presented in section 4.5. Firstly, I will present thoughts on the perceptions of the 
1965/66 massacres and the stakeholders as shown in today’s press. These thoughts will be 
based on whether the previously official New Order version of the 1965/66 events is still 
visible and upheld by some in today’s press and how valid the perceptions propagated relating 
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to the various stakeholders appear today, after 32 years of propaganda under New Order 
followed by 16 years of democracy and free speech.  
4.4.1 Communists as the common enemy  
It is evident from the reference articles that there are still misconceptions and a lack of 
understanding of communism as an ideology even today.  According to the findings, this is 
due to the distorted information received in the New Order reign and the long-lasting taboo to 
discuss the topic. The word ‘communist’ is still used today by Indonesians as negative name 
calling when someone has done something wrong or misbehaved, and some of the 
interviewees admitted to sometimes using the word for this purpose. The majority of the 
articles argue that the communist party was not in fact responsible for the coup d’état, was 
falsely accused and did not deserve the massive repercussions in 1965/66.  Many who were 
accused of being communists at the time, were subsequently proved not to have been a 
member of the party or have had any other affiliation with communism. This is likely to be 
the reason why the articles almost always had the words ‘alleged’ or ‘suspected’ attached to 
the word ‘communist’. It may lead us to think that being a communist is still considered 
something negative, to a certain extent also by those who deny the New Order version of the 
events in the 1960s.  
The analysis clearly suggests that there are still elements of various levels of distrust and even 
hatred towards communists, and that the enemy image of communists created in New Order 
still holds stand for some. As described in chapter 2, Herman and Chomsky claimed in their 
Propaganda Model (1988) that anti-communism as a national religion and control mechanism 
were among other editorially-distorting filters which applied to news reporting by the mass 
media. During New Order this was very much the case, and this filter may be said from this 
analysis to not having lost its relevance in the Indonesian context. The ideological filter 
explains the criterion of the two kinds of victims; the worthy and unworthy. The unworthy 
victims’ fate is ignored or denied, which may be said to be the situation in Indonesia where 
there has been no recognition of or resolution for the many victims who are still suffering due 
to the 1965/66 massacres. The analysis show that there are various and conflicting opinions 
on this issue in the Indonesian society, and there are indications that the press rooms may not 
be where anti-communism has its strongest hold. Still, the press workers operate as part of the 
society as a whole and within the conditions given them by the authorities and also relating 
pressure from external groups such as anti-communist groups and radical religious groups. 
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The latter will be discussed in section 4.4.4. As it emerges from the analysis, the conceptions 
following the indoctrination by the New Order regime still holds their stand to various 
degrees for the individual.  
‘Just the name Gerwani sent shivers down my spine as a kid’ 
– Dessy Sagita, journalist for The Jakarta Global, February 19th, 2014 
Gerwani stands for Gerakan Wanita Indonesia and was the women's wing of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI). According to the New Order narrative the women belonging to this 
wing of the organisation tortured and mutilated the generals kidnapped in October 1956. 
These stories were later proven false (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009: 292). Gerwani 
members were referred to as ‘sadistic whores’ in the newspapers, where people could read 
stories about the mutilation of the generals’ genitals and the gouging out of their eyes in the 
wake of orgies (The Jakarta Globe, February 28
th
, 2014). These stories were portrayed in 
detail in the movie Pengkhianatan (The Betrayal of the PKI), which was shown on the state 
TV channel every year until 1998. This was obligatory viewing for school children who wrote 
reviews of the movie every year. Dessy Sagita remembers it well (shared in an interview 
February 19
th
, 2014):  
‘Having to watch that kind of movie every year, you did 
not question whether communism was bad for you. You 
knew for sure it was bad. Even though you did not know 
what communism was all about’. 
In the article ‘On Act of Killing, No Easy Answers’ in The Jakarta Globe (February 17th, 
2014), the author related memories about how the entire village watched the propaganda 
movie together on the only TV around. ‘When the army and death squads succeeded in 
slaughtering what they called ‘communists’ the villagers cheerfully clapped their hands’. He 
stated that ‘New Order no doubt succeeded in brainwashing Indonesians, including myself, by 
declaring that communism was a common enemy and a continuous threat to the nation. It 
argued that deadly violence against communists and their sympathizers was legitimate and 
that the perpetrators had to be considered heroes’.  
The propaganda movie is no longer aired on TV. However, the history books still contain the 
same narrative as before 1998, and the same curriculum is taught in schools. Indonesians 
celebrate the Pancasila Sanctuary Day on October 1
st
, to honour the generals who were 
murdered by the communists. Then the ‘red-and white flutters at full mast, symbolizing how 
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good triumphed over evil by crushing the coup and all the unmentioned measures to purge 
that evil’ (The Jakarta Post, September 30th, 2013).   
In some of the articles the 1965/66 events were referred to by the term ‘G30SPKI’. This term 
contains the date of the alleged coup d’état on 30th September, 1965, and during the Suharto 
era PKI was added so that the date and the alleged perpetrators were inevitably linked 
together. This term is used only in the Indonesian-language newspaper, Kompas, and not in 
the English-language papers in the article selection. In the English-language papers the terms 
‘massacres’, ‘genocide’, ‘killings’, ‘purge’ or ‘violence’ are those most commonly used. The 
interviewees confirmed that ‘G30SPKI’ is often used in the Indonesian language. Sometimes 
it is shortened to ‘G20S’ as there have been suggestions to officially change the term to better 
reflect what really happened ( ‘30 September: Still Dark Until Now’  in Kompas, October 13th, 
2013)  
4.4.2 The Indonesian government and politicians  
Two main conflicting perceptions are present in the reference articles. Some support the view 
that the military and political leaders during the 1965/66 anti-communist purge should be 
considered heroes for saving the nation from communist takeover, which was also the official 
line proclaimed during the New Order regime. The dominant view, however, is that the 
leaders in the sixties were responsible for a massacre of disproportionate dimensions and 
targeted innocent people. There are of course variations within these main narratives. One of 
the nuances is the perception that communist rule would have been damaging to the nation 
and that their rise to power was forceful and violent, but that the repercussions from the 
government were still wrong and disproportionate.   
The reference articles reveal a clear perception that the current power-holders in Indonesia are 
the same as in 1965/66, if not in person then by family ties. After the time period of the 
reference articles a change of power has occurred in the wake of the presidential election in 
July, 2014. The former governor for Jakarta, belonging to the Indonesian Party of Struggle 
(PDP-P), Joko Widodo, was elected president, which might be said to be a political change of 
direction for Indonesia. Several of the other presidential candidates were former military 
generals, a common trait in Indonesian politics where strong and powerful leaders are valued. 
Some of these candidates had personal or family ties to the events of 1965/66. In the article 
‘No Inquiry Into ’65 on SBY’s Watch’ a university lecturer of defence speculated that 
Widodo was the most likely to attempt to uncover the truth about the 1965/66 events, should 
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he come to power. Now that he has it remains to be seen if this will be the case or if he will 
uphold what seems to be a tradition of silence about the human rights violations of the sixties.  
Government officials' reluctance to speak about the 1965/66 events was stated by the 
interviewees, as mentioned in section 4.2. The majority of the reference articles suggest the 
same. The few statements from government representatives in the reference articles clearly 
support the previous official line proclaimed under the New Order regime. In the commentary 
‘Act of Killing, in Contention for Oscar, Fails to Stir Indonesia’ a reference was made to a 
statement made by Indonesian Coordination Minister for Security at the time, Djoko Suyanto, 
claiming that ‘the military saved the Indonesian state’ by leading the anti-communist purge in 
the sixties (The Jakarta Globe, March 3
rd
, 2014). The said minister is himself a retired 
military commander-in-chief. The statement followed the release of the report by the national 
committee for human rights in 2012.  
More active participation in the debate by the politicians was suggested in the selected article 
as being important for Indonesia as a democracy. Several of the articles voiced 
disappointment that this topic was not a larger part of the 2014 presidential election campaign, 
and the reference articles suggest that the lack of addressing human rights violations in the 
past has led to a general mistrust towards the authorities and the judiciary. The Jakarta Post 
journalist Andreas Aditya claims that what he sees as the glorification by the political 
leadership of a history of genocide to create a climate of fear, involves a ‘very real risk that 
the country will backslide toward military dictatorship’ (The Jakarta Post, January 18th, 2014).  
4.4.3 The Indonesian military; heroes and perpetrators 
It is evident from the reference articles that there is a broadly shared understanding that the 
military were the driving force for the implementation of the anti-communist purge in 
1965/66. There are variations in the reference articles about the level of strength and power 
still held by the Indonesian military. The military had a dual function and also held political 
power under New Order. There was a significant internal reform within the Indonesian 
military after the restoration of democracy, but the selected material is inconclusive when it 
comes to how far the process of separating the military and politics have come and how much 
power is still held by the military. There are inevitably still close links between politics and 
the Indonesian military. Several of the candidates in the 2014 election were former generals, 
and there are several references in the reference articles as to how Indonesians believe in 
strong leaders, which in the Indonesian context mean military generals. With the presidential 
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election in 2014 Indonesians, however, did prove that they wanted a new direction for the 
nation as they elected a candidate who is neither a former general nor known for being a 
strong leader in the traditional Indonesian sense of the term. It was suggested in the reference 
articles that a president with a non-military background would be preferable for the nation in 
order to put an end the general distrust people across the country felt towards authorities.  
In the article ‘If democracy gets tired’, a teacher at the Defence University in Jakarta, Salim 
Said, feared that what he calls a ‘democratic burnout’ will lead to military leadership once 
again. According to Said, this will happen if the Indonesian politicians ‘continue to deplete 
public trust’. People will get tired of democracy and resort to ‘iron-fisted leaders, which in 
Indonesian history are the military’ (Kompas, January 5th, 2014).  
The view that the military has succeeded in separating themselves from politics is present in 
the reference articles (‘An impartial military as a result of democracy’ in Kompas, January 9th 
2014). According to the article the question of impartiality always arises in times of elections 
as there are concerns that the military might ‘align with certain candidates or have a certain 
vested interest to influence the election result’, which has happened in the past. The article 
claims that recent polls show that the general public is now convinced that the Indonesian 
military is ‘able to remain impartial and free from intervention of any political powers, 
including the influence of past military leaders who have now become active politicians’(ibid). 
Prior to the presidential election in 2014 Tempo Magazine conducted a nine hour interview 
with presidential candidate and a former military man, General Prabowo. The editor in chief 
of Tempo was of the opinion that the fact that the journalists did not suffer any reprisals after 
the interview, despite confrontations with Prabowo, showcases the changing times. ‘Prabowo 
now knows that he would have been scrutinized by the public had anything happened 
following his dissatisfaction with the Tempo interview’ (Arif Zulkifi, editor in chief of Tempo 
Magazine, in an interview February 24
th
, 2014).  
The level of power of the Indonesian military today will be presented further in section 4.5.  
4.4.4 Anti-communists and radical Islamic and militia groups 
There are additional voices that support the New Order narrative of the 1965/66 events in the 
reference articles. These belong primarily to radical religious groups. As previously stated in 
section 1, the propaganda under the Suharto regime claimed that communists per definition 
were also atheists and thus a threat to Islam. The reference articles suggest that this still seems 
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to be valid among certain groups. Several of the reference articles dealt with violent anti-
communism protests from various radical groups, and there are several mentions of these 
groups in the interviews as challenges to practising free speech. There are particularly three 
groups that reoccur in the articles as well as in the interviews. These are the para-military 
youth organization Pemuda Pancasila, the anti-communist group Front Anti Komunis 
Indonesia (FAKI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). Violence and 
threats seem to be part of their arsenal, and from the coverage in the reference articles they 
seem to share a notion of being above the law by attacking legal institutions and seemingly 
not fearing repercussions from the police. A commentary in The Jakarta Post talks of ‘a 
blessing of bullies’ in Indonesian society, which happens ‘through the absence of law 
enforcement against these groups’ actions’ (The Jakarta Post, November 4th, 2013). Thus, the 
article claims that these groups continue their ‘efforts to uphold their versions of what is right 
and wrong’.  
There are several suggestions in the reference articles that there are links between certain 
members of the political elite and these radical groups. The FPI was originally set up by the 
military and the police in 1998 to confront the student demonstrations at the time. The group 
then disappeared but re-emerged some years later. Then it was without formal ties to the 
military or police, but still with their informal support according to the reference articles. In 
the documentary The Act of Killing the now current and at the time former Vice President of 
Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla, appeared during a gathering for the para-military organisation, 
Pemuda Pancasila, dressed in their uniform and proudly proclaimed, ‘We need our gangsters 
to get things done’ (referred to in the article ‘Courts Wilt Under attack from Pemuda 
Pancasila Thugs’ in The Jakarta Globe, September 18th, 2013). In the commentary ‘Muscle 
testing of bullies amid dangerous state silence’ (The Jakarta Post, November 4th, 2013) the 
Home Affairs Minister at the time, Fauzii, refers to the FPI as a ‘national asset’. There is also 
mention of how the law enforcement on several occasions gave into the demands of these 
groups and, for instance, banned screenings of The Act of Killing, book signings about 
communism, or gatherings of families of victims of the 1965/66 events, instead of protecting 
them from the violent protesters to ensure freedom of speech.  
4.4.5 Concluding remarks 
It is evident from the reference articles that despite the massive transformation that the 
country has gone through over the past 16 years, there are still quite a few remnants from the 
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New Order period in the ‘new’ Indonesia. First and foremost, several of the political and 
military actors from the sixties are either still active and hold political power themselves or 
are connected by family ties to current power-holders. That these have certain interests in 
upholding the narrative propagated in the New Order era is understandable. Whether they 
attempt to do so by influencing the press to avoid journalistic attention either by legislative or 
informal methods will be further presented in section 4.5. However, it is apparent from the 
above that three decades of indoctrination has made a clear mark on the Indonesian 
population and, to a greater or lesser degree, still influences their perceptions of certain issues 
today. This also seems applicable to some degree for some of those fully aware of the 
propaganda methods utilized by the New Order regime and who are both knowledgeable 
about the context in which the massacres took place and well-informed about their political 
past and current power-structures. This serves to show that propagated narratives are long-
lived in contexts where open public debate is limited – not matter the cause – and that certain 
issues are not subjected to substantial investigative journalism. 
4.5 Restrictions on freedom of speech  
The end of the New Order regime and the turn to democracy in Indonesia has led to a vast and 
vibrant media environment. According to the above analysis, voices critical of the 
government and state institutions are visible in today’s press, which supports the Kitley's view 
(2008: 221) when he says that such critical articles appear frequently in the Indonesian press 
(Tapsell in Asian Studies Review June 2012:227). This serves as an example that times have 
changed, and Indonesian journalists can write more openly without fearing state intervention. 
The question remains however if there is more to the story than meets the eye, and how open 
and free the press in fact is when it comes to reporting on certain sensitive issues, such as the 
1965/66 massacres.  
Reporters Without Borders acknowledges that there are significant challenges when it comes 
to how freely the press operates in Indonesia. As mentioned in chapter 1, Indonesia is ranked 
as number 139 out of 178 countries on the 2013 Press Freedom Index. Freedom House 
emphasizes that press freedom is hampered by a number of legal and regulatory restrictions, 
cases of violence against journalists and self-censorship by journalists.  
In the above, I have attempted to uncover to what extent the topic of the 1965/66 massacres is 
present in today’s press and how the issue is covered. The second part of my research 
question is to what extent the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres is influenced by external 
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restrictions and/or self-censorship. This means I will also need to look beyond the written 
material to attempt to examine what articles are not written and why. As previously stated, 
there is a methodically challenge to drawing conclusions about what has not appearing in the 
printed media, and the following analysis relies more on the interviews carried out than on the 
written reference articles.   
4.5.1 Legal restrictions 
As seen in chapter 2, even the most consistent advocates of free speech acknowledge the need 
for limitations. Freedom of expression in Indonesia is guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution 
and reaffirmed in 2002
xvii
.  Chapter 1 presents a background overview of some of the 
legislation that restricts freedom of expression in Indonesia. In the following I will elaborate 
further on this. 
All the interviewed journalists agree that certain formal regulations are necessary and 
important, and that those which apply for the Indonesian press are to a large degree acceptable. 
The discrepancy between theory and practice is however raised as an issue by some of the 
interviewees. In the Indonesian context the most important legal restrictions in this regard are 
the law of defamation, the law against pornography, and law of information technology and 
electronic transaction. Most of the interview subjects view the law of defamation as the most 
significant for their daily practise in the journalism industry. As described above, this law 
falls under the Penal Code. As such, defamation is defined as written or oral communication 
that goes against the will of the affected party and might be found offensive
xviii
. These laws 
are in active use in Indonesia, and the co-producer of the documentary The Act of Killing 
explained that the risk of being sentenced under the Defamation Laws was part of his and his 
Indonesian colleagues’ reasons for remaining anonymous after releasing the documentary.  
The active use of the defamation laws has been criticised by international actors for 
encouraging self-censorship in the coverage of sensitive subjects. Similar concerns have 
arisen with more recent legislation such as the Information Technology Crime Bill and the 
Anti-Pornography Law, both introduced in 2008. These have been criticised for containing 
vague and ambiguous wording which can lead to confusion or misinterpretation and thus 
being potentially disruptive for freedom of expression in Indonesia. 
Indonesia has an established Press Council to arbitrate potential conflicts between the media 
and the public. In cases where the Council concludes that a certain paper has overstepped its 
bounds, the paper is recommended to write and print a retraction, seek balance or apologize. 
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To ensure this mechanism, the Press Council has a memorandum of understanding with both 
the police and the legal system that all complaints are firstly to be handled by this Council. 
The challenge emphasized by some of the interviewees is that procedures are not necessarily 
followed, particularly by politicians, businessmen and others belonging to the Indonesian elite. 
These often go straight to the police with their complaints, and instead of referring them to the 
Press Council the complaints may be immediately passed on to the legal system.  
‘Powerful people do not bother, but go straight to the police. It is stressful and it is scary. I do 
not think they want to throw all journalists to jail, but to scare them off. Especially if you are 
new, it will be quite a shock for you’. 
– Dessy Sagita, journalist for The Jakarta Globe, February 19th, 2014 
The above quote indicates that these laws are used to intimidate the press to self-censor, 
which supports the for-mentioned critique by some international actors that the legal 
framework is too vague and thus open for misuse. The above is not an exhaustive overview of 
the legal framework for freedom of speech, but it gives a certain snapshot. 
4.5.2 Propaganda and censorship then and now 
As stated above in section 1, Suharto and his government immediately seized control of the 
media after taking over power in 1965. Many news media were shut down and an intricate set 
of rules and regulations were put in place that imposed severe limitations for the survivors 
(Hill, 1994:11). A heavy propaganda machine was established, and the media was used to 
propagate the government’s version of what happened in the alleged coup d’état in 1965 and 
the atrocities that took place afterwards when between 500,000 to 2 million people were 
massacred (Cribb in Totten and Parssons, 2009:289).  
‘Being Editor in Chief in the Suharto era was like being a 
pilot on an airplane that was hijacked’ 
– Former editor in chief, Goenawan Muhaddad, according to current editor in chief of Tempo 
Magazine, Arif Zulkifi, February, 2014 
As mentioned under the background chapter there was an intricate legal framework in place 
during the rule of Suharto, but also unwritten rules which the media were expected to obey. 
The Kompas newspaper had a whiteboard next to the newsroom where the secretary would 
write down messages after receiving phone calls with demands from Ministry of Information, 
the military, and the department of Foreign Affairs. Not to obey these orders could lead to 
banning of the publication. Individual journalists were also privately disciplined by authorities. 
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Journalists received constant phone calls, and particularly the military commands were hard to 
disobey. Doing so could lead to a jail sentence or physical beatings from the military or police. 
In this way, the regime created an environment of fear in which journalists were consistently 
afraid of reporting anything that could be seen as critique of the ruling elite.  
The government’s restrictions were however not always verbalized in clear messages. 
According to senior editor at The Jakarta Post, Endy Bayuni, there was an ‘imaginary line’ 
under the New Order regime (from an interview on February 21
st
, 2014). The framework in 
which to practise journalism was not specifically formulated, and editors and journalists were 
left to guess by the mood of the government if it was safe to write and publish a specific story. 
If one came too close to the ‘imaginary line’ the editor in chief was given a warning by the 
Ministry of Information, and the unwritten rule was that after three warnings, the publication 
was shut down. Over thirty cases of temporary or permanent bans occurred between 1965 and 
1994. In 1994 Tempo Magazine and the mainstream publications Editor and DeTIK were 
controversially banned (Steele, 2006). All these instances served as warnings to other editors 
who would self-censor to avoid a similar fate for their publications.  
Being a journalist during the New Order era was like 
walking on a beach full of crabs. You take one step forward 
and if no crab bites your foot, you take another one. If you 
are bitten, you have to step back’. 
– Founder of Kompas, Jakob Oetama, according to the editor in chief of Tempo Magazine, 
Arif Zulkifi, February 24
th
, 2014 
Bayuni shared in an interview (February 21
st
, 2014) that he believed a certain level of risk had 
to be accepted to avoid merely being ‘a mouthpiece of the government’. Most Indonesian 
newspapers were however reluctant to take too many risks. One way to avoid repercussions 
was to ‘hide” controversial messages in their articles. In an interview (February 24th, 2014) 
senior reporter for Kompas, Maria Harteningsih, stated that under New Order she had to be 
‘clever’ when writing about the issue of the 1965/66 massacres by burying the stories in the 
middle of articles to get it past editors and published. In her view her younger colleagues 
today do not have the experience in how to write about these issues. She feels that if the 
articles are ‘bluntly’ written they will be rejected even today. Her explanation of how 
sensitive issues were hidden in less controversial stories is backed by statements from some of 
the other interviewees about how Indonesians are very good at ‘reading between the lines’. 
Under New Order this was a necessity, as a lot was not specifically stated, but implied.  
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Today Suharto’s authoritative regime is history and freedom of speech is guaranteed under the 
Constitution. According to Voltmer and Rownsley (2009) the guarantee of freedom of speech 
is usually undisputed constitutionally in transitional democracies and has been implemented 
in virtually all such (in Jebril, Stetka and Loveless, 2013:7). The analysis in this thesis shows 
that there are debates about the level of freedom of speech experienced in Indonesia today. 
One of the interviewees goes so far to that the country has ‘un-freedom of expression’ (from 
an interview with the anonymous co-producer of the ‘Act of Killing’ on March 19th, 2014). 
The mere fact that he and the other Indonesian crew behind the documentary chose to remain 
anonymous shows that there is limited space to discuss the 1965/66 massacres even today. 
Some of the interviewees do claim that major parts of the restrictions and mentality back then 
are still valid today. Thus, despite the official freedom there are still significant challenges 
when it comes to reporting about the 1965/66 massacres and other issues considered sensitive 
to the current government. There are variations in the selected material as to whether there 
still is an ‘imaginable line’ for what is accepted to report on in the Indonesian press today. 
There are indications that the notion of how freely one may practise journalism is connected 
with journalistic or editorial experience during the New Order regime. However, there is not a 
definite relation between age and duration of journalistic experience and the notion of press 
freedom in the material. Individual experiences of being either censored by their respective 
newsrooms or approached by various external actors and given warnings or direct threats 
seems to form the basis for the interviewees’ perceptions of their journalistic freedom.  
As a common denominator these challenges to freely report do however seem to be mainly 
connected with pressure or expectations to self-censor. In the following I will look into the 
issue of self-censorship and aim to uncover whether the 1965/66 reporting is influenced by 
self-censorship and why.  
4.5.3 Self-censorship and the 1965/66 massacres 
As mentioned in chapter 2 self-censorship is when journalists or editors have information they 
choose not to publish (McLaughlin in Ottosen 2001: 223 – 224; Dahl 1999:20). These are 
broad definitions without any information about the reasoning behind them. For this thesis, as 
mentioned in chapter 2, I do understand self-censorship as Tapsell sees it: ‘self-censorship 
occurs when journalists limit or ignore aspects of a story because they fear repercussions for 
those with vested interests who are cited in their report’ (in Asian Studies Review June 
2012:229). A central part of the journalistic practise is to choose which information to include 
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and what to exclude. The reasons behind these choices are relevant when it comes to self-
censorship, which often results from various external factors that are not obvious but exist and 
influence the decision-making process.  
As stated above, the analysis shows that there are still issues that are sensitive to report on in 
today’s Indonesia and the 1965/66 massacres are amongst these. Despite the formal freedom, 
the interviewees reveal that either they themselves or colleagues either belonging to their own 
news organization or others do at times restrain from covering all aspects of certain topics.  
As presented under chapter 2 it is often assumed that the function of the press is to be the 
same as in established democracies where the main function is said to be to hold the 
government and political elites accountable (Voltmer, 2006a, Scammel and Semtko, 2000a, 
Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990 in Jebril, Stetka and Loveless, 2013:7). This understanding of 
the press’s role is strongly rooted in the liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism, and 
at times transitional democracies have however shown to develop media systems that differ 
from this, which creates several – and larger – gaps between the ‘ideal’ and the reality of 
journalism than in established democracies.  (McConnell and Becker, 2002 in Jebril, Stetka 
and Loveless, 2013:7) What the’ ideal’ characteristics of the press is in Indonesia can be 
debated, as the ‘free but responsible’ Pancasila journalist has had a strong hold in the 
Indonesian society. However the official ideal is a free and independent press as guaranteed in 
the Constitution. I will in the following discuss this further in connection with the identified 
external influences for self-censorship.  
4.5.3.1 Political influence 
As referred to above, Kompas had a whiteboard where the instructions from the authorities 
were written and visible for all the editors and journalists to see under the New Order. This is 
no longer the case, and few news workers today receive direct instructions from the political 
sector. According to senior editor for The Jakarta Post, Endy Bauyundi, phone calls from 
politicians and other state officials in attempts to pressure or influence the media content do to 
a certain extent still occur, but they are few and far in-between (stated in an interview 
February 21
st
, 2014).  
‘That is still happening, but not frequently. But some would resort to that – powerful 
businessmen, politicians and the radical Islamic groups. They would resort to threats and 
violence, intimidations to deprive journalists of the freedom of the press. I cannot remember 
the last experience I had, so it must be quite a while ago. But the point is not the frequency. 
One event is enough to send a chilling effect’.  
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This analysis points to a trend where the political influence on news products presents itself in 
a much more indirect manner in Indonesia today. The Pancasila philosophy was strongly 
upheld by the Suharto government during New Order. The findings in this analysis indicate 
that there is still a notion amongst journalists that the expectations from the political sector is 
that they should be ‘responsible’ in the sense that they are loyal and non-critical towards the 
authorities and do not stir controversy with regards to certain issues, such as the 1965/66 
massacres.  
 
As previously stated, the voices of government officials appear to be absent from the 
reference articles, and the few that there are seems to be either downplaying the anti-
communist purge or defending it. According to some of the interviewees, it is challenging to 
get statements from the Indonesian elite on these kinds of issues. They do in other words 
claim that is not due to the lack of attempts to confront the political sector that this is often 
absent in the reference articles, but rather that the politicians refuse to respond. In western 
news media reporters inform the reader when a government representative chooses not to 
respond to questions, and the reader or viewer can thus draw their own conclusions about why 
they chose not to comment on a certain issue. In the Indonesian media this is not the case, and 
one is left to wonder whether the journalist has sought to get a comment from the responsible 
government body or not. Not being available for journalists is an efficient way for elite 
sources to not only withhold information, but also to send a message to the journalists that 
their attempts at critical reporting are disapproved of.  
The reference articles do, as mentioned above, demand action from the political leadership to 
address the human rights violation of the past. However, few of the reference articles call 
upon specific members of the government or political sector with their demands. Many of the 
demands are repetitions of previous demands and often are they also said in broad and general 
terms. This must considered in connection with what the press workers see as the function of 
the media. The analysis does show variations relating to what the press workers see as their 
main role. Pintak and Setiyono found in their survey (2010:1) that the way the journalists see 
their core mission has evolved but not ‘radically changed since the Suharto era’ and they 
continue to see it as their duty to ‘work for societal development and to give voice to those 
who have none’. This finding is supported by the analysis for this thesis. As previously stated, 
there is a notion of advocacy in the reference articles in the sense that they seek to reveal the 
truth about the 1965/66 massacres and aim to achieve reconciliation of the past to enable the 
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country to heal and move forward. Several of the interviewees shared that they considered 
that the most important tasks for journalists were to give a voice to the voiceless and to raise 
topics such as human rights, anti-corruption, climate change, health issues, et cetera. However, 
it must be mentioned here that I deliberately sought out some interviewees with experience 
within the human rights field, and their background may influence their views relating what 
they consider to be their most important tasks. 
 
The media workers interviewed for this analysis did however also mention holding the 
government accountable for their politics and functioning as a ‘watchdog’ was a significant 
part of the journalist role. In Pintak and Setiyono’s survey (2010: 17) the ‘watchdog’ role is 
however further down on the list of priorities. 66 percent of the respondents said that 
‘Investigating government statements’ is most important, while more than half the 
respondents state that the media should ‘support government policies’ and merely 41 percent 
think journalists should be ‘adversaries of the government’.  
It appears from this analysis that both holding the government accountable and contributing to 
social development are deemed important functions of the press. A large number of the 
reference articles called out for government action relating to the 1965/66 massacres, which 
supports the view of the interviewees who said that the ‘watchdog’ function is an essential 
part of journalistic role.  The efforts to seek the truth, represent the voiceless victims and 
reconcile the country which are apparent in the reference articles, are in line with the 
interviewees’ view that contributions to social development is also an important function of 
the press. Romano (2003: 57) found in her survey that most of the journalists saw no 
contradiction between the role of a Pancasila journalist and the role as a ‘watchdog'. What 
they did object was aggressive way the ‘watchdog’ role was conducted in western journalism. 
This may serve as part of the explanation for why the power-holders were not specifically 
confronted in the reference articles. The weariness vis a vis the power-holders and the lack of 
direct confrontations and concrete suggested actions as it appears in this analysis, clearly 
indicate that while the ‘watchdog’ role seems to be deemed important, it is still not fully 
embraced by the Indonesian press. This appears from this analysis to be a consequence of a 
combination of continuous influence and expectations from the press by the political sector, 
as well as a practice within the newsrooms and amongst the press workers themselves. The 
latter will be further discussed also under 4.5.3.4 
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Nationalism is also an aspect to be noted in this connection. The expectance of loyalty to the 
Indonesian state can be found in the reference articles relating to the documentary The Act of 
Killing. The documentary has a western producer as well as western financial support, and the 
movie is criticized for presenting an inaccurate and unbalanced ‘foreign view’ of the events as 
well as being a deliberate smear campaign of Indonesia. These are statements both from 
opinion writers as well as by official representatives. Indonesia is amongst the up-and-coming 
countries on the world market and is, as most countries, concerned about its international 
reputation. The analysis suggests that there is a notion of national pride in the Indonesian 
society. This is visible from the expressed pride that the Indonesian nation was ‘saved’ from 
communism, but also from a certain collective shame related to the 1965/66 massacres. That 
people are concerned about external impressions of their nations may be true in many 
countries, and it is understandable that this may also influence news reporting. This may be 
even more valid for Indonesia, which is an emerging democracy and economy with a recent 
history of colonization and wide-spread poverty. As mentioned in chapter 2, loyalty towards 
the state is common within the press during crisis and conflict. The 1965/66 massacres took 
place after an alleged coup d’etat and a political crisis and was followed by over thirty years 
of dictatorship and an emergency-like situation which may say to have enhanced the feelings 
of loyalty to the Indonesian nation.  
The findings in this analysis do however suggest that the most significant political means to 
influence the Indonesian press today is media ownership. This was described in chapter 1 and 
further presented in chapter 2. Daniel Dhakidao (1991: 283) has argued that Indonesian 
journalists under the New Order became ‘politically de-capacitated’ due to a concentration of 
ownership encouraged by both the state and market forces as early as 1975 (Tapsell in Asian 
Studies Review June 2012: 232). Media groups were already then owned by the powerful elite 
and expanded into other industries (Hill, 1994:81-110), which according to Tapsell continued 
also after New Order and is still valid in the Indonesian society. In the following I will look 
into the commercial side of the press and how the media content is influenced by the existing 
ownership structures today. 
4.5.3.2 Commercial influence 
The analysis in this thesis supports the findings of Tapsell (in the Asian Studies Review June 
2012: 241) and Pintak and Setiyono (2010:16) saying that the ownership structures in 
Indonesia do influence the media content. As mentioned in the background chapter, the news 
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organizations grew in numbers and the media environment diversified following the reforms 
after the fall of the Suharto regime. The new investors included members of a web of political, 
well-connected business people that surrounded former President Suharto’s family and friends, 
or heads of conglomerates with strong ties to powerful officials. The top-selling newspapers 
in Indonesia are Kompas and Jawa Pos, while other influential publications include Tempo, 
Pos Kota and The Jakarta Post (Tapsell, 2012: 234). The Jakarta Globe is a rival of English-
language The Jakarta Post, but with a lower circulation and reach. As mentioned in chapter 1, 
The Jakarta Globe was established in 2008 by today’s owner and deputy chairman of the 
Lippo Group, James Riady. Lippo Group is the largest property owner and developer in 
Indonesia, and has business interests in banking, publishing and retail. Riady has a large 
media portfolio and his son is the director of digital media at The Jakarta Globe. James Riady 
is not himself a political figure but has close links to politicians in Indonesia and the US (The 
New York Times, 20 March, 2011, in Tapsell, 2012: 235). Aburizal Bakrie is the chairman of 
the Golkar Party and was amongst the candidates for the 2014 presidential elections. He is 
one of Indonesia’s richest men and controls companies in a wide range of businesses, 
including mining, oil and gas, palm oil, property and finance. The Bakrie media portfolio is 
large and includes television stations, online newswire media and newspapers.  
 
Indonesia’s biggest media conglomerate is the Jawa Pos Group. The CEO is a former Tempo 
journalist, Dahlan Iskan, who in 2011 was appointed to the position of State-owned 
Enterprises Minister by then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The Jawa Pos Group 
owns 140 newspapers all over Indonesia in addition to multiple TV stations and is the most 
rapidly expanding conglomerate investing in new newspapers. They also invest in fields such 
as hotels, real estate, transport and power.   
There is an inconsistency in the reference articles to what extent the public is aware of these 
ownership structures. Some of the interviewees claim is it is transparent and open and thus 
feel confident that the general public is able to distinguish between propaganda and ‘real 
news’. Due to the vastness of the media in Indonesia, alternatives and various views are 
available to people. One of the interviewees stated that there is a certain balance as the various 
TV-stations are owned by politicians from different parties who ‘fight each other’ and that the 
audience can thus compare and in this way easily spot propaganda.  Other interviewees 
pointed out that those living in Jakarta and those of the middle class are enlightened about the 
commercial side of the media landscape. However, this information and knowledge might not 
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reach out to those living in decentralized areas at lower levels of society, which means most 
of the large Indonesian population. 
All the media workers interviewed for this thesis are of the opinion that the ownership 
structures do influence editorial content for the media in Indonesia. Thus, the degree of 
independence and ability to report freely on all issues vary significantly amongst the different 
media organizations. Tempo Magazine is according to this analysis least affected by the 
business side out of the news organizations included in this thesis. The ownership of Tempo is 
in part on the hands of the employees, who have a large percentage of the shares. The Jakarta 
Post is also said to be relatively independent. It was founded in 1993 by a consortium of five 
newspapers, of which Kompas was the largest. Tempo and the political party Golkar’s 
newspaper were also part of the consortium. Senior editor, Endy Bayuni, was the chief editor 
at from 2004 – 2010.  He confided that it was a balancing act to be chief editor as he had to 
consider the interests of the board as well as the public’s expectations that the editorial 
content were in line with the paper’s vision to promote democracy, human rights and being a 
voice for the voiceless. In addition there were external demands and strongly expressed 
interests from outside the media organization. After six years Bayuni choose to leave the 
position (from interview on February 21
st
, 2014).  
Kompas is published by the second largest press media owner in Indonesia, Kompas 
Gramedia. According to several of the interviewees, it is claimed to be less independent than 
the other news media in this analysis, particularly due to its commercial and historical ties 
with Catholicism which is said to create a certain wariness about crossing Muslim interests.  
‘Kompas is very, very careful about that. They are very 
afraid that conflict can affect the business side. So you 
cannot expect Kompas to reveal corruption and human 
rights violence. They will not’. 
– Editor in chief of Tempo Magazine, Arif Zulkifi, February 23rd, 2014. 
The broadcasting media reaches a much larger percentage of the Indonesian widespread 
population than print media. The interviewees claim that broadcast media in general are less 
independent, partly because there are more TV stations than print media owned by the 
political elite. The interviews for this thesis were conducted merely two months prior to the 
2014 presidential elections. Two of the presidential candidates, the for-mentioned Aburizal 
Bakrie and Surya Poloh, as well Harry Tanoe, who ran for the vice presidency, own several of 
the largest TV stations.  
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‘I honestly do not trust any of them (the TV stations) now. 
There is too much politics. Politicians say that those who 
own the media will have more access to voice their 
campaign or whatever their agenda is’. 
 
– Journalist at The Jakarta Post, Margareth Aritonang, in an interview on February 24th, 2014 
 
It is not obvious from the analysis exactly how the interviewed media workers experience the 
influence from the commercial side of journalism. As an editor in chief for The Jakarta Post, 
Endy Bayuni were at times explicitly told the expectations relating the media content by the 
board, other times not. Lower level journalists are given directions by their editors, however 
often also merely left with an expectation that they should consider the interests of their 
editors and news organizations before writing a story. The majority of the interviewees share 
that they experience a constant pressure to be wary of what they write about certain issues, 
particularly concerning religion, human rights issues and corruption relating to elite members 
of the Indonesian society.  
‘There are not a lot of media that are courageous enough to 
go all the way. It is about business and you have to protect 
your interests’. 
– Journalist at The Jakarta Globe, Dessy Sagita, February 19th, 2014 
4.5.3.3 Safety and security 
Failing to adhere to the ‘imaginable line’ could mean prison or worse for journalists during 
the New Order era. This analysis show that the timidity for physical repercussions from the 
state institutions amongst press workers is fading. Some of the interviewees claim that the 
fears altogether are unfounded and rooted in a false sense that the old system still stands.  
‘Of course there is the family of Suharto. Of course there is money. But we have to say to the 
younger journalists that as long as they write ethical articles that covers both sides, they do 
not need to be afraid. You cannot be afraid of a shadow. You cannot be afraid of a ghost’. 
- Arif Zulkifi, editor in chief of Tempo Magazine, February 23rd, 2014 
The above quote does not represent the majority of the interviewees, who did in fact reveal 
that they fear repercussions if they were to report on certain issues. The feared repercussions 
seem to be of various natures. The sense of physical safety when writing about so-called sensitive 
issues appears to co-relate with previous experiences of receiving violent threats. The entire 
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Indonesian crew of the documentary The Act of Killing chose to be anonymous out of fear of 
repercussions, and the interviewed co-producer revealed that they had received death threats 
and other serious warnings through their anonymous web accounts (in an interview on March 
19
th
,  2014). Several of the other interviewees have also had experiences of being threatened 
in various forms by politicians, members of the military or, most commonly, radical Islamic 
groups. Senior Reporter at Kompas, Iwan Santosa, covers mainly military and defence issues 
and reveals that he has at times feared for his life. He states that there are certain boundaries 
that he cannot cross, despite the theoretical press freedom in today’s Indonesia (reported in an 
interview on February 24
th
, 2014). 
The analysis reveal variations when it comes to how the interviewees consider the level of 
strength and power still held by the Indonesian military and how closely it is linked to politics 
in today’s Indonesia. Prior to the presidential election in 2014 Tempo Magazine conducted a 
nine hour interview with presidential candidate and former General Prabowo. The editor in 
chief of Tempo, Arif Zulkifi, is of the opinion that if the journalists did not experience any re-
percussions after the interview despite heated exchange with Prabowo, it showcases the 
changing times. ‘Prabowo now knows that he would have been scrutinized by the public had 
anything happened following his dissatisfaction with the Tempo interview’ (in an interview 
February 24
th
, 2014). Senior editor for The Jakarta Post, Endy Bayuni, stated in an interview 
(February 21
st
,  2014) that he no longer knows the names of other military men than the chief 
of staff, as this is today not crucial knowledge for an editor, whereas in the past he would 
have known them all as they would be influencing editorial decisions.  
The analysis clearly shows that there is significant pressure inflicted on the press by radical 
religious groups to control the information flow on certain so-called sensitive issues. During New 
Order, religious issues were downplayed in the media. After initial electoral successes in the 
1960s, Islamic grassroots organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) were barred from 
politics and confined to civil society to prevent them from becoming an alternative to the 
regime. With Suharto’s departure, Islam entered mainstream politics and took a more overt 
role in society (Smith, 2005 in Pintak and Setiyono, 2010:6). Some news organizations chose 
to a large degree not to cover Islamic politics and its militant off-shoots to avoid serving as 
channels for propaganda for radical Islamic groups and inflaming opinion and thus 
exacerbating the conflicts. The Jakarta Post was amongst these, according to senior editor 
Endy Bayundi (revealed in an interview February 21
st
, 2014). This was according to Bayundi 
a deliberate decision after a violent episode when The Jakarta Post received a bomb threat 
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and had their premises occupied by protesters following a published article unpopular with a 
radical Islamic group. The Jakarta Post and other media were criticized for practicing self-
censorship by other media organizations. Meanwhile, other media were also physically 
targeted by the militants. Newspapers were stormed and journalists threatened and roughed up 
and Tempo Magazine was also victim of a bombing in 2004, though with no casualties.  
Journalism professor and human rights activist, Andreas Harsono, received massive physical threats 
after sharing a video where men from a religious minority group, Ahmadiah, were beaten to 
death by militia in 2011. 
‘My mate was threatened; my son who was just born was also threatened, not to say my wife. 
The most bizarre was a Dayak militia, who publicly declared he would drink blood from my 
skull’. 
- Andreas Harsono, Human Rights Watch, February 19th, 2014 
On the issue of the 1965/66 massacres, the analysis clearly show that religious groups and 
various militia are very much involved in attempting to determine the framework of public. 
The para-military youth organization Pemuda Pancasila, the anti-communist group Front Anti 
Komunis Indonesia (FAKI), and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) are 
said to have participated in the 1955/66 massacres and are among the most significant voices 
in the reference articles. According to the interview subjects, these groups do at times resort to 
threats or violence against journalists and editors in attempts to control the media publications. 
The reference articles suggest that there are political influences behind some of the actions 
carried out by certain religious groups to limit open public debate in the media, but it is not 
overtly stated. It is worth mentioning however that there seems to be a shared notion that 
these groups are free to operate without too much control by or interference from the police or 
politicians. Instead, it is even hinted in the reference articles and interviews that they may be 
protected and thus able to maintain their pressures on Indonesian journalists and editors, again 
leading to self-censorship.  
4.5.3.4 Professional practise and organizational structures in the newsrooms 
This analysis does, as stated above, reveal variations in opinions related to role of the 
Indonesian media, whether its main function is to serve as a ‘watchdog’ holding the ruling 
power accountable or to serve as ‘responsible’ and contribute to developing the country. The 
latter can be said to be a remain from the New Order era when the Pancasila journalist was 
upheld as the ideal, which meant that the press should not be confronting the government, but 
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rather working alongside them to develop the nation. It is evident from this analysis – despite 
the reforms and time passed – that some press workers still thinks in terms of the New Order 
era and the old mind-set. Some journalists have found it difficult to adapt to the journalistic 
transition. Senior journalist for Kompas, Maria Hartiningsih, admitted in an interview 
(February 24
th
, 2014) that she finds the current journalistic landscape confusing and that 
things were ‘easier’ during New Order. Then there was a common enemy, the dictatorship, 
but after the reform even the most idealistic activists became corrupt politicians. She therefore 
finds it difficult to know who to trust, and the journalistic world is ‘less clear’ then in the New 
Order era. This view is also supported by other interviewees and some of the reference 
articles for the analysis.  
The Indonesian society is said to be hierarchical, which seems accurate for the news 
organizations used for this thesis. In most cases journalists do not oppose their editors or those 
senior in rank or age. The most influential editors are likely to be senior in age and they thus 
have had media experience under the New Order era. They may therefore maintain certain 
mind-sets and traditions of self-censorship that can be maintained in the newsrooms even 
today. Maria Hartiningsih told in an interview (February 24
th
, 2014) about a younger 
colleague who wrote an article about the Academy Award nomination of the documentary 
The Act of Killing, that panned it. The article was in addition ‘hidden’ in the middle of the 
paper among ads and insignificant content and was thus not very visible. She asked the 
journalist why she had written a one-sided article of such poor quality, only to be told that the 
editor had not only given strict instructions, but had also heavily edited the piece. Hartiningsih 
had not confronted the editor, but claimed that he must have deliberately sabotaged the article 
rendering it ‘poor and insignificant’, because she knew him to be in fact a better writer and 
editor than the article showed. In her opinion this serves as an example of how some editors 
are still severely cautious when it comes to certain issues, and that younger journalists are not 
equipped to write stories about events like the 1965/66 massacres. They write ‘bluntly’ 
instead of ‘between the lines’ and are thus being either rejected or edited.  
There are clear indications in the analysis that there is lack of professionalism and that the 
current journalistic practice in general may not be fully aligned with the desired standards of 
quality and ethics. As mentioned under chapter 1 the increased freedom of the press after the 
New Order regime resulted in an influx of sensation stories and publications of rumors and 
speculations. The press saw a need to increase professionalism and improve ethical standards, 
so Kode Etikk Wartawan Indonesia was created (Indonesian Journalists’ Code of Ethics). 
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According to this analysis, these are however not adequately followed. This also supports the 
findings by Pintak and Setiyono (2010:1) in their nationwide survey amongst 600 journalists 
where they found that the journalists saw the lack of professionalism as the greatest risk to 
their industry. One serious challenge to point out is corruption. Corruption is widespread in 
Indonesian society and the journalism industry is no exception. Reporters are frequently given 
‘taxi money’ for attending news conferences and some editors receive remuneration in cash, 
cars, and favors. Several of the interviewees for this thesis admit to having been offered 
bribes, and share that they know that many of their colleagues do accept them. According to 
Pintak and Setiyono’s survey, few of the respondents (less than five percent) saw it as 
acceptable to take payments for stories, however 40 percent supported the idea of being given 
travel money when writing a story or agreeing to write a story in return for a purchase of 
advertising (2010: 20). This practise of ‘envelope journalism’ is closely linked to the 
conditions of journalists in the country as it is seen as an occupation with limited status and 
low pay. A few of the younger journalists interviewed for this thesis were not trained 
journalists and stated that they occupied temporary positions. They saw their jobs as stepping 
stones to a different career path in the future. This consideration is also linked to politics 
because journalistic and media conditions in practical terms depend on political will. 
Journalism lecturer and human rights activist Andreas Harsono claims that further training 
and professionalization are necessary in order to improve the current situation where there is a 
lack of thorough and investigative journalism, particularly in terms of sensitive issues such as 
the 1965/66 massacres. In his opinion journalists themselves hold quite a bit of power. He 
believes that the younger generation can change Indonesian journalism by meeting two 
criteria for writing well, i.e.  the journalist has to be knowledgeable, and the journalist has to 
be brave and daring enough to rebel against the newsroom (expressed in an interview with 
Andreas Harsono in February 19
th
, 2014).  
4.5.4 Concluding remarks 
Indonesians have experienced a significant transformation in their ability to freely express 
their opinions through public channels, and the press does publish articles which are critical of 
the government and state institutions. And, according to Kitley (2008: 221), this occurs 
frequently (Tapsell in Asian Studies Review June 2012:227).  Despite this, the analysis shows 
that the press’ freedom to cover certain issues is hampered by various factors. The legal 
framework regulating free speech is actively used, and anti-obscenity laws and civil and 
criminal libel laws particularly restrict the free reporting of certain issues. Self-censorship 
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plays an important role in this case. Self-censorship is often the result of various external 
factors that are not obvious, but exist and influence the decision-making process.  
In this day and age in Indonesia, political and commercial interests are often intertwined due 
to the ownership structures. Several prominent political figures have large shareholdings in 
various media groups, particularly in broadcast media. They also have significant ownership 
of the written media. As emerges from this analysis, the ownership structures do indeed 
influence media content with editorial decisions being based on the stated or assumed 
interests of the media group and its owner. As senior journalists had grown highly accustomed 
to ‘sensing’ the journalistic space tolerated under the New Order era, the findings of this 
analysis suggest that these senior journalists have carried on this tradition into the new era. In 
the past news workers were forced to make assumptions about the interests of external actors, 
such as politicians and the military whom they tried to please in order to avoid physical 
reprisals. Some still do, but for the most part present editorial decisions seem to be more 
influenced by the assumed interests of the media group than the owners’ commercial or 
political interests. In Indonesia's hierarchical society the younger journalists will not 
necessarily challenge their seniors in age or rank, but work in accordance with their spoken or 
unspoken interests. Self-censorship still seems to be conducted out of a fear of repercussions, 
but repercussions more related to career opportunities and financial gain than violent 
consequences. The journalistic profession is underpaid and under-valued in Indonesia. To 
mitigate self-censorship there is a need to further professionalise journalism and enhance 
skills and knowledge of younger journalists, as suggested in the reference articles.  
5. Sum-up and conclusion  
As presented under chapter 1, the aim for this thesis was to answer the research question: 
How do Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 massacres today, and to what degree is the 
coverage influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship? For the analysis I have 
looked into the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres in articles in the newspapers The Jakarta 
Globe, The Jakarta Post and Kompas over a period of seven months and conducted interviews 
with ten Indonesian media workers and one independent documentary maker. 
It is a two part question, with the first part asking how the Indonesian press covers the 
1965/66 massacres today.  To answer this I looked at the extent to which the topic was 
prioritized amidst other media content in the selected time period, whose voices were 
represented in the articles, and what were the issues raised relating the 1965/66 massacres. In 
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addition I looked into how relevant stakeholders were described in the reference articles to 
reflect on whether the indoctrinated perceptions imposed by the New Order still are valid in 
today’s Indonesia. 
The second part of my research question is to what degree is the coverage of the 1965/66 
massacres was influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. To answer this I had to 
also look beyond the reference articles and ask media workers if and how they experience 
formal and informal restrictions on their freedom to report on all issues, including the 1965/66 
massacres.    
In the following I will sum up my findings and make my conclusions. 
5.1 Coverage of the 1965/66 massacres today 
The analysis clearly shows that the topic of the 1965/66 massacres is not merely one for the 
history books, but is also part of the present and a relevant issue in the Indonesian press even 
today. The coverage is not limited to revealing stories about past events, but also requiring the 
current government to take action and ensure national reconciliation. It is evident from the 
analysis that the issue of the 1965/66 massacres is not resolved or by any means exhausted as 
a topic for debate. Most of the reference articles were on the contrary pointing to the need for 
more debate and more sharing of information in efforts to reveal the full truth about the 
events. This does indicate that there has been limited public discussion on the topic also in the 
recent years after the democratization in 1998, which were also specifically said in several of 
the reference articles and also supports the findings in previous research (Roosa, 2006, Cribb, 
2009). The coverage may to a large extent be said to be advocacy efforts by civil society 
actors (non-governmental organizations, activists, historians) and also the press itself, 
attempting to influence the government and political sector to take action and revealing the 
truth and ensuring some form of reconciliation. The demands in the reference articles were 
clear enough, but specifically whom they target was more indistinct. The articles did point to 
the Indonesian government as responsible for resolving these events from the past, and 
critique against the power-holders were most certainly found in many of the reference articles. 
This finding supports other research which says that the government and other state 
institutions are frequently criticized in Indonesian media (Kitley, 2008:221 in Tapsell in Asian 
Studies Review June 2012: 227). The critique was however at times quite vague and 
formulated in general terms, often replicating and repeating other statements found in other 
articles. Few others than the President were specifically mentioned or confronted with these 
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demands or accusations. Government officials and other politicians were remarkably absent 
as sources in the articles which required them to act. The public “debate” on the issue may 
thus be said to be rather one-sided with accusations and demands to which no-one responds. 
The findings from the analysis also show that three decades of indoctrination has made its 
clear mark on people’s conceptions, which influences the current debate on the 1965/66 
massacres. Remnant of New Order propaganda seems still to be visible in today’s press in the 
descriptions of the various stakeholders of the events that took place in the 1960s. This serves 
to show that propagated narratives are long-lived in contexts where open public debate is 
limited – no matter the cause - and where certain issues are not subjected to substantial 
investigative journalism. Several of the political and military actors from the 1960s are still 
politically active or have family ties to those in power. That these have certain interests in 
upholding the narrative propagated during the New Order era is understandable.  
The primary aim for this thesis did not include doing an extensive analysis on whether the 
Indonesian state still uses means of propaganda today. This thesis describes the state 
propaganda in New Order and looks at the transition and developments of the Indonesian 
society. The analysis looks into whether there are still remnants of what was propagated 
during New Order, and relating to the current situation in Indonesia it discusses propaganda in 
the form of censorship and causes for self-censorship. A separate and broader analysis on 
state propaganda in Indonesia today would be interesting to see in connection with the 
findings from this thesis, which could potentially enhance the insight into these issues and 
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding. 
5.2 Restrictions on free reporting  
Despite the transformation of the Indonesian society and guaranteed freedom of speech under 
the Constitution, the Indonesian press is still not fully free. This is evident from the findings 
of this analysis. Independent and thorough reporting on sensitive issues such as the 1965/66 
massacres, is hampered by formal and informal restrictions which primarily encourage to self-
censorship. The legal framework regulating free speech is in active use and laws on obscene 
content and civil and criminal libel laws are particularly restricting free reporting on certain 
issues. This occurs primarily because journalists attempt to avoid them by self-censoring. 
Self-censorship often results from various external factors which are not obvious, but exist 
and influence the journalistic decision-making processes. Fear of repercussions from the 
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power-holders and state institutions used to be the main cause for self-censorship during New 
Order. In this day and age the pressure and influence to self-restrain from publishing certain 
stories seem to be more indirect. The findings indicate that the political elite still expect a 
certain conduct from the press and are not particularly responsive when being confronted 
about ‘sensitive’ issues. The tradition of the ‘responsible’ Pancasila journalist (Romano, 2003, 
Hill, 2007) seems still to be very much relevant even today. Not only does it seem to be 
expected by the government and political elite, but it also seems to be deemed important by 
the press themselves. This can be drawn from the non-confrontational form of journalism as 
seen in the reference articles, in addition their efforts to advocating for and contributing to 
resolving the 1965/66 massacres and reconciling the nation. The interviewees revealed that 
they see it as their task to contribute to developing their nation and that journalism has a clear 
social mission. On the other hand, they also see it as their duty to hold the government 
accountable for their actions. Many of the reference articles contained critique against the 
government and described their wrong-doings and required political will to resolve them. 
These efforts were however less confrontational than what would be the case in western 
media. Thus, it may be said that, despite the attempts to hold the government accountable, the 
Indonesian press do not fully embrace the role as a ‘watchdog’ relating to the 1965/66 
massacres. This finding supports the results of research by Tapsell (in the Asian Studies 
Review June 2012: 229) and Pintak and Sentiyono, 2010: 1) 
Political influence on editorial content can, according to this analysis, best be seen through 
their commercial involvement in the media industry. Several significant political figures have 
large shares in various media houses, particularly within broadcast media, but also print media. 
As it emerges from this analysis, the ownership structures do influence the media’s content 
and editorial decisions are made based on either stated or assumed interests of the media 
organizations and owners. This supports the results of research by Tapsell (in the Asian 
Review Studies June 2012:241). Senior media workers are highly accustomed to ‘sensing’ the 
journalistic space that they are allowed to operate within, which they were forced to do during 
New Order. The findings of this analysis suggest that they still think along the same mind-set 
and have carried the tradition with them into the new era. In the past, media workers often had 
to guess what the interests of power-players were and then aimed to please these to avoid 
repercussions. Some still do this, but this analysis suggest that the editorial decisions for the 
most part are more influenced by interests within the media organizations, primarily the 
commercial and political interests of the owners. In the hierarchical society of Indonesia, the 
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younger journalists rarely oppose those senior to them in age or rang and perform their jobs 
according to the spoken or unspoken interests of those above them in the organizational 
structure. Self-censorship seems to be still conducted out of fears of repercussions, however 
more relating to career opportunities and financial aspects than violent consequences. The 
journalistic profession is not highly valued in Indonesia and the journalists are underpaid. 
This also leads to challenges relating bribes and the so-called ‘envelope journalism’ in the 
Indonesian society where corruption is wide-spread. This analysis indicate a need to further 
professionalize Indonesian journalism and to ensure improved conditions for the upcoming 
generation of journalists, who did not practice journalism under New Order, and reduce the 
continuous breeding-ground for self-censorship.  
Although less than before, fears of physical repercussions are still present among Indonesian 
press workers. They seem however to worry less about violence by state institutions, but 
more-so by radical religious or anti-communist groups. As it emerges from this analysis, these 
groups are very much present in the debate on the 1965/66 issues. Through protests, threats 
and acts of violence towards those with conflicting views, they attempt to set the frames for 
the debate on the issue of the 1965/66 massacres. The findings of this analysis indicate that 
these groups are condoned by the politically elite and not held legally responsible, which 
enhances the effects of their actions and imposes restrictions on free debate by promoting 
self-censorship. 
5.3 Other remarks 
The analysis for this thesis was conducted prior to the change of political leadership in 
Indonesia. The new President, former Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, was inaugurated on 
October 20
th
 in 2014 after winning the presidential elections in July. Widodo is the seventh 
Indonesian president and the first not to have come from the military or political elite. He is 
the son of a carpenter and prior to his political career he worked as a furniture exporter. He is 
claimed by many to represents a new political direction for Indonesia, and on a Time 
Magazine cover (on October 16
th) he is called ‘a new hope’ and ‘a force for democracy’.  A 
few of the reference articles for this thesis mentioned him as more likely to take action and 
reconcile the nation after the 1965/66 massacres than his opponents, and several of the 
interviewees were of the same opinion. It remains to be seen whether they are right. In his  
government, there are several politicians from the traditional, powerful elite, including the 
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newly elected Vice President Jusuf Kalla from the Golkar Party, who was mentioned in the 
preface for this thesis for his appearance in the documentary The Act of Killing.  
The massacres that took place in the 1960s affected such a large number of people directly or 
indirectly, and this analysis clearly suggests that the wounds are still deep and visible in the 
Indonesian society. The silence and taboos that followed these events led to a situation where 
people still today learn that there are victims within their closest families and many are still 
grieving. It seems obvious that the issues relating to the 1965/66 massacres will not quietly 
fade away, but will need to be resolved in some way or another by Indonesian authorities. As 
it emerges from this analysis, surprisingly few seem to demand legal justice and criminal 
persecutions following the massacres, unlike for many others of the world’s massive 
massacres and genocides. Nelson Mandela and his South African model of reconciliation are 
mentioned as an ideal in some of the reference articles and by some of the interviewees. 
Komnas Ham, the national human rights committee, took a gentle first step towards an official 
resolution after concluding their four years-long inquiry into the massacres by officially 
deeming them ‘gross human rights violations’ and providing recommendations for next steps. 
If these will be taken, remains to be seen. This analysis suggests that in any case the 
Indonesian press are likely to continue to being part of the process by raising the issue, despite 
the various restrictions and influences hampering a fully free debate. 
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